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PANEL II:  The Global Contours of IP      
Protection for Trade Dress, 
Industrial Design, Applied 
Art, and Product 
Configuration 
Moderator:  Susan Scafidi 
Panelists:  Orit Fischman Afori 
 Wendy J. Gordon 
 Mark Janis 
 Jonathan Moskin 
 
MS. SCHAFFER-GOLDMAN: 
Hello, everyone.  As many of you know, I am Regina Schaffer-
Goldman, and I am the Editor-in-Chief of the IPLJ. 
I would like to welcome you to our second panel today.  I just 
wanted to remind you that the IPLJ is currently publishing its 20th 
Volume this year.  Past IPLJ issues are available outside on the 
desk.  Please feel free to take one.  The transcript of the 
symposium will be published in our third book, due out in the 
Spring of 2010. 
 
A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexx/book3.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
   Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School (2009–10). 
**   Associate Professor, College of Management Academic Studies Law School, Israel. 
***   Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  Professor 
Gordon’s presentation is copyright © 2010 by Wendy J. Gordon.  She would like to 
thank Stacey Dogan for her helpful comments, and Todd Marabella and Jennifer Yoon 
for research assistance.  
**** Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University, Maurer 
School of Law. 
***** Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP, New York, New York.  
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Our second panel will examine “The Global Contours of IP 
Protection for Trade Dress, Industrial Design, Applied Art and 
Product Configuration.”  I am so pleased to introduce our 
moderator for this panel, Susan Scafidi. 
Susan Scafidi is a visiting Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law 
School, where she teaches fashion law, property, and trust and 
estates.  Professor Scafidi has also taught a course on IP and design 
and was very recently here at Fordham.  She is also the first law 
professor in the U.S. to teach a course on fashion law.  In addition, 
she is the author of the inimitable blog “Counterfeit Chic,” with 
which many Fordham fans are familiar.  Thank you so much for 
being here, Professor Scafidi. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Regina, thank you so much for that kind introduction.  Also, 
thanks to you and to Emily and to all of the members of the Journal 
for organizing this tremendous symposium. 
Just a few quick remarks—former Senator Bill Bradley, who 
still holds the record for the highest percentage of accurate free 
throws in the history of college basketball, used to say, “It’s that all 
important sense of where you are.”  So where we are is as follows: 
if we were to start from the premise that IP should all fall under 
one umbrella (and of course, not everyone agrees with that, but 
that ship has more or less sailed), then an ideal system would look 
something like this: a large white public domain and little carve-
outs for copyright and patent and trademark, each separate and 
neatly defined.  In fact, of course, the system looks more like a 
Venn diagram: everything overlaps a little bit and those boundaries 
between copyright and patent and trademark have to be policed in 
some fashion. 
That’s done in, of course, a number of different ways by using 
substantive categorical rules.  We know that we move classic 
literary and artistic works over to copyright,1 inventions over to 
patent and so forth.2  Then we make some additional categorical 
 
 1 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (5) (2006); see also id. § 101. 
 2 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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decisions like a statutory decision to put architecture in copyright,3 
although it bleeds over into trademark occasionally. 
We use descriptive categories as well as substantive categories, 
so short phrases for example, don’t belong in copyright, but do 
belong in trademark if they meet other qualifications.4 
Then we use doctrinal means to police those boundaries, 
including our primary topic for today, and that is functionality.  Of 
course we are still dealing with, in this panel and other ways, that 
grey area in the middle.  What is in the middle of the diagram, at 
the point where copyright, patent, and trademark overlap?  If you 
approach it from copyright, you’ll think of it in terms of applied 
art. 
If you approach it from patents, you’ll think in terms of 
industrial design.  If you approach it from trademark, you’ll think 
in terms of trade dress.  Perhaps if you’re from a system not our 
own, outside the U.S., you’ll think of it as a fourth category and 
just call it design. 
Either way, it’s one of the most fascinating areas of IP, not 
least because it’s the little loose strand that if you pull, could tear 
the entire system apart, which is why we have a distinguished 
panel here today to answer these questions, and to explore, 
particularly, how functionality works in all of these areas. 
So let me begin by introducing our first panelist.  I will 
introduce them not all at once, but successively before each speaks, 
just in case someone comes in later and isn’t sure whom they’re 
listening to. 
Starting with Professor Afori, Orit Fischman Afori—you have 
the official bio.  So let’s make this a little more fun.  She gets the 
award for coming to us from the furthest.  She flew all the way 
from Israel just for the weekend to come to our symposium. 
She teaches at the College of Management and Academic 
Studies Law School in Israel, offering a variety of courses: 
corporate law, copyright law, introduction to intellectual property, 
 
 3 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8). 
 4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1125. 
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and a clinical seminar on intellectual property and law and 
technology. 
She has wonderful interests within IP, including an area that 
I’m especially interested in, cultural rights as human rights.  But 
perhaps most important of all, I learned last night that Orit is such 
a brilliant teacher that her two children, ages eight and five, 
regularly debate copyright issues.  So with that, let me give you 
Orit. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
First, I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me.  It’s 
a great pleasure for me to be here.  The question in this symposium 
is a very problematic one, the functionality threshold.  My talk will 
focus on the function of the non-functionality requirement in 
industrial design law and, more specifically, on the confusion it 
creates. 
Industrial design law protects the appearance of useful articles.  
A key requirement for eligibility is that only the non-functional 
features of the design will be protected.5  The basic justification for 
the non-functionality requirement in design law is to avoid 
undermining the provisions of patent law, which under certain 
strict conditions, protects functional elements.6 
However, the reality is that it is extremely difficult to 
implement the non-functionality requirement in practice.  After a 
very short overview of the requirement in American and English 
law, the student-oriented part, I’ll present what are, in my opinion, 
the three major reasons for the difficulties in applying the non-
functionality requirement.  I will conclude by proposing a way to 
ease the difficulties while maintaining the requirements. 
The Non-Functionality Requirement in Current Law 
In the U.S., there are currently three major legal paths for 
protecting industrial designs: copyright law, trademark law, and 
patent law.  Each of the three paths provides protection only for the 
non-functional features. 
 
 5 35 U.S.C. § 171; L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.04(5)–(6) (2005). 
 6 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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As to copyright, currently the U.S. Act allows protection of 
designs by including “applied art” in the subject matter,7 and 
including the requirement that the protected features are the non-
functional ones.  Both the copyright office and the courts have 
adopted the (impossible) “separability” concept in the application 
of the non-functionality doctrine.8 
This concept not only prohibits protection of functional 
features, but also requires that those non-functional protected 
features are separated from the functional ones.9  The problematic 
outcome is that non-functional features that are not separated from 
the functional ones are actually deprived of protection.10 
As a result, U.S. courts have developed doctrines that are 
aimed to ease this outcome.  These doctrines in turn have been 
criticized as making the separability criterion unclear, impossible 
to carry out, arbitrary, and subject to manipulations.11 
As to the second path—the patent design right—its purpose 
was to fill the gap between copyright and patent protection.  To 
this end, an additional “ornamentality” requirement was added to 
the design patent right.12  At the same time, the utility requirement, 
which is compulsory with respect to regular patents, was 
 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 8 See id. (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspect of the 
article.”). 
 9 Id.; see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (describing the conceptual separability test); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 
796, 801–05 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (describing the physical separability test). 
 10 See, e.g., Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (explaining that the bicycle rack lost its protections because it combines both 
function and aesthetics); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(3) (2005). 
 11 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3(c) (Little, 
Brown and Co. 1989); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08(B)(3); J.H. Reichman, 
Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging 
Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267, 350–65 (1983); Eric Setliff, Copyright and 
Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 63 
(2006). 
 12 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
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eliminated for design patents.13  Consequently, design patents 
protect only the ornamental aspects of the patented design, and not 
the functional features or aspects.14 
The third path for protecting designs in the U.S. is through 
trademark law by a trade dress claim.  An important requirement 
for protection of trademark in general is that it does not contain 
functional elements.15  The non-functionality requirement, 
therefore, also applies to trade dress cases.16 
Things are more complicated when we turn to review the 
protection of industrial designs in England because there are 
currently five paths for protecting designs, which include three 
national paths and two E.U. paths. 
In all five paths in England, the basic principle of no protection 
of functional features governs.  To keep this brief, I would just like 
to mention that Article 7(1) of the European Design Directive 
provides that “A design right shall not subsist in features of 
appearance of a product which are solely dictated by its technical 
function”17 and in the following I will relate to this “solely 
dictated” test.  Similar provisions forbidding protection of 
functional elements have been introduced into national legislation. 
To sum up the student oriented part, a key requirement for 
design eligibility is that there is no protection for functional 
elements.  However, there are considerable difficulties in applying 
this rule in practice. 
Why Applying the Non-functionality Requirement Is Difficult 
The application of the non-functionality requirement creates 
many difficulties.  I would like to offer three major reasons for 
this, all of which are linked to the difficulty in defining the term 
“functionality.” 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 5, § 23.08. 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
165 (1995) (“‘[A] product feature is functional’ . . . ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose 
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article’” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. 
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))). 
 16 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
 17 Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC). 
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The first question that should be asked is how to define “non-
functional designs.”  “Functional” is an abstract term that can be 
defined in a number of ways.  As I mentioned before, the European 
test is whether the design is solely dictated by its technical 
function.18 
At first glance, this appears to be a very good and helpful 
definition for a test for functional designs.  A functional design is a 
design which is solely dictated by its technical function.19 
However, a closer look reveals the fundamental problem: when 
can we conclude that a design meets the requirement of “solely 
dictated by technical requirement?” 
If an article can be formed in several shapes, but in all other 
respects is entirely functional, would it be correct to say that its 
design is solely dictated by functional considerations? 
The problem with these kinds of situations is that since there 
are several effective options for shaping the article, the choice of 
the actual design must be done on the basis of considerations that 
are not purely technical, such as an aesthetic consideration. 
For example, look at the illustration of the coffee machines.  
There are many functional designs for a coffee machine.  On which 
basis does a designer make his choice?  All of the designs are 
functional. Therefore, the choice is made according to aesthetic 
considerations, or other considerations which are not necessarily 
functional. 
The House of Lords debated this issue in the well-known 
Amp20 case and concluded that “solely dictated” by technical 
functional features means that “the designer was adopting a shape 
for the article only according to the question whether it works that 
way, without considering whether it appeals to the eye.”21  
However, it does not mean, the House of Lords continues, that 
there are no other pure, technically-functional possible designs for 
the same article.22 
 
 18 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 19 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 20 Amp, Inc. v. Utilux Pty Ltd, [1971] F.S.R. 572 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 21 See id. at 583.  
 22 See id.  
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In other words, this test is the subjective-intent-of-a-designer 
test, which, like all subjective tests, is very weak.  It is very weak 
because of the obvious problem of how a court is supposed to 
determine what the designer really had in mind: functional 
considerations or aesthetic ones. 
The subjective intent test calls for manipulations, which may 
result in arbitrary decisions.  More to the point, however, it is not 
clear why the private intent of the designer is relevant to the 
rationale of the legal requirement. 
Therefore, I think, it’s clear that there is a need for an objective 
test which would serve the rationale of the non-functionality 
requirement.  Actually, Lord Reid himself admitted in the Amp 
case that the ambiguity and the controversy over the eligibility of 
designs for protection “are centered around the word ‘dictated,’ 
which is a metaphorical word out of place in a statutory 
definition.”23 
The second reason why applying the non-functionality 
requirement is difficult is that many contemporary designs 
combine functional and aesthetical elements and it is impossible to 
separate between the two. 
These designs follow the “Form-Follows-Function” (F3) 
school, which originated in the ’20s.24  This school still dominates 
design to this day.25 
The question then becomes whether such design, which merges 
functional and aesthetical features, should be deprived of 
protection entirely.  The answer to this question under the 
American separability test is yes:26 no protection is provided to 
 
 23 Id. at 578. 
 24 See Setliff, supra note 11, at 62 (“According to this Functionalist philosophy, the 
usual character of any product was best determined by the internal logic of its 
construction and mechanism.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 25 An example of a contemporary design which follows the “form-follows-function” 
philosophy is Philippe Starck’s lemon press “Juicy Salif,” produced by Alessi in 1990. 
See Posting of Angie to Introduction to Design, Philippe Starck—Juicy Salif, 
http://introtodesign.blogspot.com/2008/06/philippe-starck-juicy-salif.html (June 24, 
2008).  Other examples are the many registered designs for chairs. See, e.g., U.S. Patent 
No. D514,835 (filed Jan. 19, 2005) (issued Feb. 14, 2006). 
 26 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08(B)(3). 
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ornamental features if they are merged into the functional features 
of the design.27  (And maybe by this way, the whole American 
industry is pushed into the style of separate ornamental features 
attached to articles.  In other words, there is a legal basis for 
American kitsch.) 
By contrast, under the English model, registration of design 
that had a functional purpose is permitted.28  Nevertheless, this 
English model suffers from drawbacks too, because courts have 
limited the ability to register these kinds of merged designs if they 
“impose restrictions on the freedom of subsequent designers by 
leaving no room for alternative designs of the same article.”29 
Therefore, there is no legal certainty with respect to the 
eligibility of a design, because whether a design imposes 
restrictions on the freedom of subsequent designers is not a simple 
question to answer. 
A third difficulty in applying the non-functionality requirement 
is that the meaning of the term “function” is itself less than clear.  
One way to understand the term “functional” is in a narrow sense 
of “technical function” or “physical function;” this is the English 
way of interpretation according to the Design Directive.30 
In a broader sense, function may be understood as a way for 
achieving an aim.31 
If we accept the broader definition of function, then we must 
ask what the difference between function and aesthetic is.  This is 
because under the broad definition, aesthetic may be perceived as a 
function.  Aesthetic contributes something real to the product, 
justifying the consumer’s decision to buy it.  Why does a consumer 
 
 27 See Jonathan E. Moskin, The Shape of Things to Come—Emerging Theories of 
Design Protection, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 691, 694 (2002); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989). 
 28 See In re Wingate’s Registered Design, (1935) 52 R.P.C. 126, 131 (Ch.) (U.K.) 
(“[S]o long as the design, qua design, is something which makes an appeal to the eye and 
is new or original, it is properly a subject matter of registration . . . notwithstanding that it 
also involves a method of construction which may be entitled to protection as a patent.”). 
 29 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(2), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC). 
 30 See id.  
 31 See Merriam-Webster Online, Function, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/function (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (stating that function is synonymous with 
“purpose”).  
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buy a certain belt or a certain handbag?  Because they like it! 
Therefore, aesthetics themselves have a function. 
If this is the case, then the entire structure of industrial design 
protection, in which we protect external appearance but not 
function, collapses.  I think that this theoretical inquiry into the 
term functionality is found in the development of the trade dress 
claim in the U.S. 
Courts have developed a very sophisticated concept of 
aesthetic functionality.  Whereas strict functionality examines 
whether the dress adds something to the use of the article (this is 
the utilitarian functionality),32 aesthetic functionality examines 
whether the dress makes the article more appealing to the public 
through its appearance.33  However, in 2001, the Supreme Court 
somewhat narrowed this doctrine in the TrafFix34 case by 
explaining that the aesthetic and the utilitarian aspects must be 
distinguished from each other.35 
This third difficulty can be resolved by defining “function” 
narrowly.  However, the first and second difficulties are still 
relevant. 
It is very hard to distinguish between technical and other 
considerations which dictate the design.  And, on many occasions, 
aesthetics merge with the functional or technical features. 
These difficulties create confusion, or “disorder” in industrial 
design law, because we must follow the non-functionality 
requirement, even though in many cases it does not make any 
sense. 
 
 32 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(“An article of manufacture necessarily serves a utilitarian purpose, and the design of a 
useful article is deemed to be functional when the appearance of the claimed design is 
dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”). 
 33 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938) (“When goods are bought 
largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely 
contribute to that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are 
intended.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 34 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 35 Id. at 33. 
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Solutions 
It is clear that it is not possible to drop the non-functionality 
requirement because it is essential.  The question is whether there 
is a way to ease this confusion? 
My proposal is a very pragmatic one.  Since it is impossible to 
define accurately when a design is purely functional, and since the 
problem of designs that combine both function and aesthetics is an 
urgent one, it might make more sense not to resolve the problem at 
the registration stage but rather to postpone it to a later stage when 
the case of infringement is brought before a court. 
Thus, where a design raises the question of functionality and 
the answer is not clear cut, the design will nonetheless be 
registered.  However, the determination of which features of the 
design are being protected will be made by a court in the context of 
a specific infringement claim. 
There are some very significant advantages to this method I’m 
proposing.  First, registration of partially functional designs will 
not hinder innovative or creative efforts since registration can 
always be challenged in court.  It is a known fact that there is no 
real prosecution of designs.  Actually, designs are deposited during 
registration. 
I suggest simply adding a reservation concerning a possible 
functionality problem when a design is deposited.  This proposal 
has the advantage of allowing challenges to the eligibility of 
registered IP rights at all stages.  This is usually done by a 
competitor in an indirect way by just using the design and 
subsequently facing an infringement action. 
Another advantage of this proposal is that there are difficulties 
in defining the threshold of eligibility.  The question is ultimately 
the eye-of-the-judge test.  The eye-of-the-judge test is arbitrary by 
nature.  Therefore, it is better to shift the exercise of the test to the 
specific context of a court case between actual parties.  Such a 
case-by-case resolution is the traditional common law way of 
C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2010  2:43 PM 
794 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:783 
doing things36 and is less disruptive than an advanced 
determination of eligibility with respect to property rights. 
The common law system already contains a mechanism which 
calls for shifting complicated decisions, which are derived from 
factual bases, to court.  This pragmatic approach should be used in 
the industrial design realm as well. 
Mainly, the non-functionality requirement should function as 
an open-standard norm similar to originality,37 substantial 
similarity,38 and other open-standard norms. When these standards 
are actually employed, it is impossible to impose a single rule to 
cover a limitless range of factual possibilities. 
Another advantage of this proposal is that courts are in a better 
position to hear evidence prior to deciding whether granting 
protection in a specific case would close off practical alternatives 
for future designers.  In other words, the decision whether a feature 
is functional or not would be made on a practical rather than a 
theoretical basis based on evidence and actual data presented in 
court. 
Finally, the most important advantage of this proposal is that it 
has the merit of eliminating the “all or nothing” consequences of 
the non-functionality requirement: the decision is always made in a 
specific context of a competing use.  Future designers may reopen 
the question, leading to a different result in a different case, based 
on a new technological development or new factual basis. 
These are basically the most sound and robust justifications for 
this kind of solution.  To conclude, shifting the non-functionality 
requirement into an open-standard rule that is determined on a 
case-by-case basis, would be a pragmatic solution to this unending 
debate over how to apply the non-functionality requirement. 
 
 36 See MARTIN HOWE & A.D. RUSSELL-CLARKE, RUSSELL-CLARKE ON INDUSTRIAL 
DESIGNS 35–42 (Sweet & Maxwell 2005). 
 37 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, 
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by 
the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”). 
 38 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 618–21 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing the 
various approaches to the “substantial similarity” test). 
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Thank you. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Wendy Gordon, as one of the first ladies of copyright, is truly 
one of those people who needs no introduction, but let me do it 
anyway, because it’s just so much fun. 
For those of you who may not know Wendy Gordon, she is the 
Philip S. Beck Professor of Law at Boston University School of 
Law.  And if you don’t know her, the Supreme Court certainly 
does, because she’s been cited in three different opinions.  She also 
recently completed her second term as Chair of the AALS Section 
on IP. 
Her interests may begin with copyright, but they extend 
throughout the rest of intellectual property, including trademark 
and unfair competition and legal theory, etc.  She’s even taught a 
course on functionality, so we get the microcosm of that today. 
Wendy, thank you so much for being here. 
PROF. GORDON: 
I appreciate that kind introduction. Fordham just seems to 
breed generosity of spirit.  Thank you, Susan, and thank you to the 
organizers of this symposium. 
Before beginning, let me mention that I will confine myself to 
a limited number of arenas. Thus, for example, I’m not going to 
discuss design patents, which will be the focus of another 
speaker’s remarks. I will also not discuss the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality.  My primary goal will be to compare trademark’s 
doctrine of utilitarian “functionality” with copyright’s doctrine of 
“separability,” and to show how for at least two circuit court 
opinions, the two doctrines may be converging.  I hope to stimulate 
discussion of whether such convergence would be a good idea.  
To do that, I’d initially like to bring you back to 1964, when 
the Supreme Court issued its Sears39 and Compco40 decisions.  In 
these two cases, the Supreme Court ruled that courts could not use 
state unfair competition law to enjoin the duplication of useful 
 
 39 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 40 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
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product designs.  In dicta, the Court essentially said that anything 
not protected by a federal patent or a federal copyright, but that lies 
within the general subject matter of either of those federal laws, 
must go into the public domain,41 at least as far as state law is 
concerned.  After Sears and Compco, it looked like state 
trademark-type protection to enjoin the confusing use of source-
identifying product shapes was being wiped off the map.42   
Since then, of course, we’ve seen a lot of developments at the 
intersection of these three areas of law, patent, copyright, and 
trademark.  In particular, we’ve seen increasing use of the Lanham 
Act, which, as a federal law, is not subject to preemption the way 
the state laws at issue in the Sears-Compco cases were.  The 
Lanham Act sustained the strength of trade dress law:43 allowing 
 
 41 See Compco, 376 U.S. at 237–38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. 
42  The Court wrote,  
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in 
some other way, that the design is “nonfunctional” and not essential 
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied 
may have a “secondary meaning” which identifies the maker to the 
trade, or that there may be “confusion” among purchasers as to which 
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence 
in applying a State’s law requiring such precautions as labeling; 
however, and regardless of the copier’s motives, neither these facts 
nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or 
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling. 
Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. 
 The later Supreme Court case of Bonito Boats, discussed infra, can be read as 
rendering ineffective the part of the Compco opinion that disapproved of state 
prohibitions against the confusing use of distinctive “nonfunctional” features. See Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989).  Mark Alan Thurmon 
argues that after Bonito Boats, “There is no federal right to copy a distinctive, non-
functional design.” Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark  Law’s  
Functionality  Doctrine, 56  FLA. L. REV. 243, 313 (2004).  However, as Thurmon also 
notes, opposing positions are taken by other commentators. Id. at 313 n.316 and sources 
cited therein.  
43  See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 887, 898–99 (“Although ‘trade dress’ originally referred primarily to packaging, 
containers, and labels, in recent years the concept has expanded to cover product 
configurations and even the ‘look and feel’ of products and service establishments.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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trademark-type protection for distinctive non-functional product 
and container shapes.44 
Over time, Sears-Compco shrank down even as applied to state 
law.  For example, state trade secret law was upheld against a 
preemption challenge,45 and a California law criminalizing the 
duplication of certain sound recordings was upheld against 
preemption.46  It became clear that, depending on the context, 
states could restrain or punish the copying of at least some 
products left unprotected by federal copyright or patent law.    
Then the Supreme Court drew on the Lanham Act itself to 
refine its pre-emption position.  In the 1989 case Bonito Boats,47 
the Supreme Court did two things.  First, it reasserted that at its 
core Sears-Compco was basically correct: that “federal patent laws 
do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use’”48 which states may 
not abrogate.  Accordingly, the Court struck down a Florida statute 
that prohibited certain copying of boat hull designs.49  Second, the 
Bonito Boats Court went out of its way to say, we don’t mean to 
threaten the law of trade dress too much.50  
 Referring to the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, the 
Court wrote:  
Congress has . . . given federal recognition to many 
of the concerns [such as avoiding consumer 
confusion] that underlie the state tort of unfair 
competition, and the application of Sears and 
Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product 
 
 44 See id.  Dratler sees “the federalization of trademark law under the Lanham Act” as 
having apparently made a “successful end run” around the practical effects that Sears and 
Compco might have had on trade dress law. Id. at 923.  Nevertheless, as Dratler himself 
cautions, the policies of Sears and Compco have been taken into account by cases and 
commentators in assessing how the Lanham Act should treat industrial design. Id. at 923–
24. 
45  Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (holding Ohio trade secret law was 
not preempted by federal patent law). 
 46 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1972) (upholding California statute 
against preemption challenge).  
 47 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  
 48 Id. at 165 (emphasis in original). 
49  Id. at 144.  
 50 See id. at 154–56. 
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which have been shown to identify source must take 
account of competing federal policies in this 
regard.51   
So Bonito Boats can be read as approving protection for 
“nonfunctional” aspects of product design when necessary to avert 
consumer confusion—and as assigning to “nonfunctionality” the 
role, inter alia, of safeguarding the limits embodied in the patent 
system. 
Patents are hard to obtain and have a short duration.52  If the 
law allowed relatively easy trademark protection through the 
accumulation of secondary meaning, or relatively easy copyright 
protection through the device of originality, we could end up 
trapping functional minor advances not worthy of patent, and 
extending rights in such things for the very long term that 
copyright gives, or in the case of trademark, potentially forever.  
Even for advances that are worthy of patent, it disserves patent law 
goals to extend protection beyond the statutory term.53 
So consider the guy who’s trying to decide what to do with his 
invention.  If it’s got a physical shape, he might be saying to 
himself, “Well, I don’t want to go the patent route.  It’s expensive, 
I only get the patent under certain conditions, I’ve got to disclose 
my invention, and the whole thing goes into the public domain 
after about 20 years.54  If I can figure out some way to give the 
product source-identifying significance, or use my originality to 
make it pretty enough, let me go the trademark or copyright route, 
and I’ll get much longer protection.” 
 
51  Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (making reference to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
(dicta)).  The Bonito Boats Court also reinterpreted Sears as dealing with “the functional 
aspects of a product[,]” not mentioning whether it also viewed Compco’s elimination of 
the nonfunctional/functional distinction as mere dicta. Id. at 156. 
52  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 53 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating that the 
purposes of the federal patent system are: “[f]irst, patent law seeks to foster and reward 
invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation 
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the 
stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain 
remain there for the free use of the public” (emphasis added)). 
 54 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
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If that alternate set of routes were relatively easy to use, it 
would destroy much of the patent system as it exists.  So it’s not 
surprising that the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats effectively said 
that however whittled away the Sears-Compco cases from 1964 
might be, their basic emphasis on preserving the patent system, and 
its primacy for the public domain, deserves our attention.55  Nor is 
it surprising that the Bonito Boats opinion reserved its approbation 
of trade dress for “nonfunctional” shapes. 
After Bonito Boats came Dastar.56  There the Supreme Court 
addressed how federal trademark fared when it encountered part of 
the copyright domain.  In Dastar, the Supreme Court gave a 
narrow interpretation to the Lanham Act in order to prevent an 
end-run around copyright’s rules about the need for public access 
to expired copyrights.57 
In that case, a public domain film was “copied substantially”58 
and repackaged by a third party.59  The third party sold it, which 
was perfectly permissible as far as the expired copyright in the film 
was concerned.60  Yet lower courts had given the original maker of 
the film a trademark cause of action on the grounds known as 
reverse passing off: that the repackager had attributed to itself the 
efforts of somebody else.61 
The Supreme Court stepped in to say, we really must honor the 
copyright judgment that this film is in the public domain.62  The 
route the Court chose was to narrow the Lanham Act, so that the 
word “origin” in section 43(a) applied only to the source of 
physical manufacture rather than to the source of ideas.63  The 
 
 55 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57. 
 56 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 57 See id. at 33–34. 
58  Id. at 28. 
 59 See id. at 25–26. 
 60 See id. at 38. 
 61 Id. at 27–28. 
 62 Id. at 37–38.  The Court wanted to avoid “creat[ing] a species of mutant copyright 
law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to use’ expired copyrights.” Id. at 34 
(quotation marks omitted) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 165 (1989)). 
 63 Id. at 37. 
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defendant had physically manufactured the films it distributed, so 
it was not guilty of reverse passing off.64 
Thus we have the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats 
reemphasizing the importance of patent, including patent’s limited 
duration and high standards that put innovations into the public 
domain. We have Dastar, which reinforced the importance of the 
copyright public domain.  In addition, in the nineteenth century, 
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden65 made clear that copyright 
must defer to patent when useful methods are at issue.66  Copyright 
should not grant exclusive rights even in artistic creations67 if the 
result might be to lock up a useful method that patent law would 
govern or put into the public domain.68 Today’s statute is explicit 
 
 64 See id. at 38.  
65  101 U.S. 99 (1879).  
66  The refusal to use copyright to grant rights in useful methods could also be 
considered an issue of copyright’s own proper internal boundaries.  Yet the Court treated 
patent law as relevant.  Thus, a key issue in Baker was whether “the copyright in a book” 
describing a bookkeeping method could restrain strangers from reproducing “the ruled 
lines and headings” necessary to employ the bookkeeping system. Id. at 101.  The Court 
held copyright law gave no such right lest the use of the method itself be constrained.  
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art 
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been 
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.  
That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to 
an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected 
to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right 
therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from 
the government.   
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).   
67 It might be argued that the lines and headings in Baker were insufficiently original 
or artistic to be protected by copyright even had there been no trespass on patent’s 
territory.   I do not pretend to have expertise in 1879 copyright law.  Nevertheless, the 
Court’s approach does not seem to depend on any finding that the lines and headings 
were unoriginal.  Rather, the contrast with art per se lay in the purposes art serves. Id. at 
103–04.  Wrote the Court, inter alia:  
where the art [that a book] teaches cannot be used without employing 
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are 
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as 
necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not 
given for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the 
art, but for the purpose of practical application.   
Id. at 103 (emphasis added). 
68  Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a question 
which is not before us.  It was not patented, and is open and free to 
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in disclaiming copyright for methods, ideas, processes and the 
like.69   
 All these decisions have implications for how federal law 
should be interpreted, implicitly in Bonito Boats and explicitly in 
Baker and Dastar.  Dastar suggests that federal trademark law 
must sometimes defer to copyright’s definition of the public 
domain; Baker posits that copyright must sometimes defer to 
patent’s definition of the public domain; and Bonito Boats suggests 
that the public has some rights to copy and to use functional 
objects and discoveries that are unpatented.  What are the courts 
and other branches of government doing with these instructions?    
 Historically, trademark law has assessed a number of factors to 
monitor its border with patent; one of the important factors was 
whether a given design was a “competitive necessity” in the sense 
that few or no equally good alternative designs existed.70  In a few 
minutes I will turn to TrafFix, a fairly new Supreme Court opinion 
that may drastically reduce the relevance of design alternatives to 
trademark law.  We are not sure what the future of trademark will 
bring.  
 Let me begin, though, with copyright, and a test it uses to 
monitor its border with patent.  I will focus on one version of that 
test, which does not depend on the availability of “alternative 
designs.”   
Copyright law refuses to grant exclusive rights to some original 
creations potentially within its ambit, in part to secure the primacy 
of patent and the patent public domain.  Copyright has many 
devices for doing so.  For purposes of examining industrial design, 
the most important of the copyright doctrines is the following rule: 
that those pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are “useful 
 
the use of the public.  And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines 
and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it. 
Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
69   17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form . . . .”).  
70  See generally Thurmon, supra note 42. 
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objects” can be copyrighted only if their aesthetic aspects are 
separable from their utilitarian ones.71 
Admittedly, as our prior speaker Orit Fischman Afori says, 
“Aesthetics are a kind of function.”  The Copyright Act addresses 
that issue in its skillful definition of “useful article,” which you’ll 
find at section 101.72 A useful article “is an article having an 
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information.”73  I’ve 
emphasized that last bit because it describes the functions that are 
appropriate for copyright. It is perfectly appropriate for copyright 
“to portray . . . appearance” or “to convey information.”  Those are 
copyright functions.  A three-dimensional object that solely serves 
these functions is not a “useful article.”  
 By contrast, if a three-dimensional object74 serves additional or 
other utilitarian functions, it is a “useful article” and must pass the 
separability test in order to obtain copyright protection:  
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered 
a . . . sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.75 
The separability test applies if you’re trying to get protection 
for a piece of industrial design as a sculptural object and that 
design serves—as it almost always does—a function other than 
conveying appearance or information.  Examples of objects subject 
to the separability test would include, for example, the chair or the 
coffee makers that Orit presented in her slides, or an ornamental 
 
71  17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial graphic, and sculptural works” and “useful 
article”). 
 72 Id. (defining “useful article”). 
 73 Id. (emphasis added).  
74 Such objects (other than buildings, which are subject to separate protection under 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)) usually seek copyright as “sculptural” works, id. § 102(a)(5),  and 
such works are subject to the separability test if they are “useful articles.” 
 75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
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belt buckle76 or a visually pleasing bicycle rack.77  These are 
“useful articles.”  If their creators try to get them protection as 
sculptural works, the separability test might well deny them 
copyright.  
 Orit has emphasized the difficulties courts have had in 
applying the separability test.  Those difficulties and the resulting 
variations among courts cannot be denied.  But I see my task as 
trying to get an overview of separability.  One way to achieve that 
goal is by focusing on an interpretation of the separability doctrine 
that is fairly unambiguous: namely, that copyright should be 
granted to an aesthetic feature only if, inter alia, “the useful article 
in which [the feature] is embodied would be equally useful without 
it.”78 I call this the “shaving-off” test: strip off the aesthetics, and 
ask if the object still functions as effectively.  A “shaving-off” 
interpretation is advanced as a component of a test for conceputal 
separability by a noted commentator (Paul Goldstein, from whom I 
quote) and is inherent in the analysis of at least one respected court 
(the Second Circuit in Carol Barnhart).79   
 
 76 See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 77 See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
78  This is the second prong of Paul Goldstein’s suggested “distillation” of conceptual 
separability: “a pictorial, graphic or sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a 
useful article is conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art 
traditionally, conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally 
useful without it.” See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3, at 2:67 (2d 
ed. 2003 & Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).  As discussed further infra, the “shave-off” 
test is most clearly applied in Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 
411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying mannequin torsos copyright).   
 The first prong of Goldstein’s test (the work standing on its own as art) is 
problematic for many reasons, including its malleability.  But since Goldstein’s two-
prong test is cumulative (it uses the word “and” between the prongs), a work will fail to 
obtain copyright if it fails to meet either of the two prongs.  If it fails the second prong, 
that is sufficient to bar copyright.  The second prong is the one I employ (whether the 
object would be equally useful if shaved of its allegedly copyrightable elements).  And 
that second prong tends to provide relatively unambiguous and predictable results.   
 In Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 
2004), the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt a variant of the shave-off test, over a vigorous 
dissent. See id. at 932–34 (Kanne, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, the majority opinion 
devotes some attention to the possibility of alternative designs. Id. at 929–30.  
79  Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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 Admittedly, this test I adapt from Carol Barnhart is not a 
majority or even plurality rule.  For example, the Second Circuit 
itself, in a later case, used a different interpretation of separability, 
without rejecting the Barnhart result.80  But for purposes of our 
discussion, the shave-off test I offer has many virtues.  First, I 
think it is consistent with many case results, and sensitive to patent 
concerns.  Second, it “holds still”: one can make predictions, I 
think, about what copyrights it will bar.  If one shaves off the 
arguably original (aesthetic) features, will the object still function 
as well?  That’s not usually a hard question to answer.  Third, it 
offers a striking contrast to historic trademark law, which will help 
the clarity of our discussion. The pre-TrafFix functionality test of 
trademark law looks to whether an object has alternatives.  
Consider a bicycle rack made of undulating tubing that is 
aesthetically pleasing in a form-follows-function way.  Under the 
“shaving-off” test, it could not be copyrighted, because if one 
removed its undulations, there would be nothing to which the 
bicycles and their locks could attach.  Under the “alternatives” test 
now so controversial in trademark law, on the other hand, the bike 
rack might be “nonfunctional” because so many alternatives exist 
to the particular shape.81   
I do not argue substantively that the shave-off test is the best 
one—I am not even sure Goldstein would say that of his test.82  
But for purposes of understanding potential differences between 
“functionality” and “separability,” the shave-off test is an excellent 
one. 
 Now that we have temporarily “fixed” part of our interpretation 
of separability, we can ask what purposes such a broad prohibition 
might serve from an institutional perspective.  I don’t mean that 
these purposes were embraced by Congress deliberately—the 
 
80  See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145. 
81  Thus, in Brandir, the court found a bicycle rack uncopyrightable, but on the question 
of trademark functionality, Brandir remanded: “[I]t is the absence of alternative 
constructions performing the same function that renders the feature functional” for 
trademark purposes, and that was seen as a question of fact not suitable for summary 
judgment. Id. at 1148–49.  An object could be “inseparable” and noncopyrightable, but  
nevertheless “nonfunctional” and capable (if distinctive) of serving as a trademark.     
82  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2.5.3, at 2:68–71.  
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historical record is complex83—but that the purposes may 
nevertheless have been served.  
 Separability if interpreted strictly (that is, using the “shaving-
off test”) can be seen as a way of reducing judicial and litigation 
costs.  It is possible that Congress by adopting the separability test 
in 1976 avoided for copyright the morass of what we term in 
trademark law the functionality doctrine.84  “Separability” could 
allow courts to avoid deciding, for example, whether there are 
many competitive alternatives available for a particular lamp 
design, or a particular chair design.85 Separability can be 
understood as instructing judges to avoid the hard questions: if you 
can’t separate the function out, such that the artwork can still exist 
afterwards, then just deny copyright to the whole thing. Avoid 
complicated questions of how good this particular object is at its 
task, whether giving it a copyright will allow sufficient scope to 
later designers, or questions about the object’s artistic quality.  If 
the object doesn’t pass the separability test, the battle’s over.  No 
copyright. 
Thus I’m speculating that in making this choice for 
separability, Congress may have enabled an experiment in 
reducing litigation and lightening the judicial load. (Whether the 
courts took advantage of the opportunity is a separate question.) 
 
83  See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright 
Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 
1143, 1259–64 (detailing the interactions that gave rise to the separability test and its 
adoption in the 1976 Act). 
84  Mark Alan Thurmon describes the 1928–81 developments in trademark 
functionality doctrine as “turbulent.” See Thurmon, supra note 42, at 271–82. 
85  In fact, when the Copyright Act was passed, the availability of competitive 
alternatives looked like it was very important to the trademark test for functionality. The 
Copyright Act embodying the separability test was passed in 1976. Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 93-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810, 
1101 (2006)).  The Morton-Norwich court supplied examples of cases in 1976 and 1973 
that emphasized an inquiry into “alternatives” as part of the functionality inquiry in 
trademark law. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  
The Morton-Norwich opinion also cited some cases in which functionality was found 
despite the presence of alternative designs. Id.; see also Thurmon, supra note 42, at 271–
82 (suggesting that the Restatement (First) of Torts in 1938 temporarily pulled trademark 
courts away from developing a consensus that functionality should be viewed from the 
perspective of “competitive need” in which analysis of alternative designs would have 
played an important role). 
C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2010  2:43 PM 
806 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:783 
The legislative history states that Congress saw a need for a bright 
line test; 86 it doesn’t reveal the underlying logic of that choice.  
Whatever the explanation, the separability test seems to me on 
its face to deny judges an immense amount of discretion.  Now as 
the courts have actually interpreted separability, they have been 
more protective of their powers.  Some objects that you might 
think didn’t possess separable aesthetic and functional features,  
have been granted copyright protection. 
But by and large, in my view, the courts have been fairly 
restrictive in their grants of copyright—following implicitly some 
version of the “shaving-off” test perhaps—and have for example 
denied copyright to immensely creative bicycle rack designs87 and 
torsos of the human figure being used as store mannequins.88  To 
illustrate the strictness of the “separability” approach in practice, 
consider architecture. 
 
86   [T]he Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible 
between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works 
of industrial design.  A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or 
graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is 
printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, 
wallpaper, containers, and the like.  The same is true when a statue or 
carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer 
case [347 U.S. 201 (1954)], is incorporated into a product without 
losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art.  On the other 
hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be 
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention is not 
to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an 
automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or 
any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or 
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian 
aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the 
bill. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 At least one court, however, argues that “[t]he language employed by Congress is 
not the language of a bright-line rule of universal application” but rather “general policy 
guidance.” Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 
2004).  I think that assessment overstates the indeterminacy of the statute.   
 87 See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 88 See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(denying mannequin torsos copyright). But see Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932 (holding that 
a mannequin is copyrightable “because [it] was the product of a creative process 
unfettered by functional concerns”). 
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For some time, buildings were copyrightable only as sculptural 
objects, and therefore as “useful articles” had to pass the 
separability test.  They generally could not pass. Except as to 
discrete ornaments like “gargoyles,” “Congress and the courts 
refused to acknowledge any separability that would permit 
protection for a building itself.”89  “Finished buildings generally 
were not considered protected . . . .”90   
In order to adhere to the Berne Convention in regard to 
architecture, Congress twice amended the Copyright Act.  In the 
second amendment, Congress gave architecture a new category 
free of the strict separability analysis.91 The new test seems to be 
whether the “design elements are not functionally required,”92 
apparently a test easier for copyright claimants to pass than 
separability. 
Without the separability rule, product shapes probably could be 
protectable to a much greater extent than they are. Perhaps they 
would only be struck down if they violated yet another copyright 
rule, perhaps the doctrine called “merger.”93 Merger is usually 
employed to keep ideas free from copyright protection, but the 
general policies of the doctrine apply equally well to functional 
objects.94 
Merger strikes only rarely.  It’s like lightning, whereas a lack 
of separability is an everyday occurrence, like rain. 
 
89 JULIE COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH OKEDIJI & MAUREEN O’ROURKE, 
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 269 (2d ed. 2006). 
90  Id. 
91  See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 702–06, 
104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02, 106, 120, 301).    
92  COHEN ET AL., supra note 89, at 276 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–52)). 
 93 See generally Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 
1967) (providing general information about the merger doctrine and idea/expression 
dichotomy).   
94  Thus, at various times courts have used the “idea/expression dichotomy” to deny 
copyright protection to three-dimensional objects. See Reichman, supra note 83, at 1234 
& n.476. 
 Merger is not the only alternative. Another approach might be to deny copyright to 
objects whose shapes are “functionally required.” See discussion of architectural works 
supra text accompanying notes 91–92.  Such a test, like merger, is much less demanding 
than the separability test—at least on its face. 
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The merger doctrine came into being via judicial interpretation 
long ago.95  Although you can describe merger in many ways, as it 
applies to our concerns the merger doctrine basically would deny 
copyright to an expressive work conveying an idea or serving a 
functional purpose if giving copyright would threaten to lock up 
the idea or function in the copyright holder’s hands.96  That is, a 
finding of merger can be precluded by showing there are a 
multitude of alternative ways to express the idea or attractively 
carry out the function.  It resembles the pre-TrafFix “functionality” 
inquiry more closely than it does the “shave-off” version of 
separability. 
Merger is supposed to keep copyright from checkmating the 
public’s interest in free use in ideas and unpatented products.  The 
Morrissey97 court used the word “checkmate” to indicate that a 
court should consider a piece of expression “merged” into its idea 
before the point is reached when the expression is the sole way of 
conveying the idea.  Even if there are a few potential alternate 
versions possible, copyright should be denied if you can see the 
end in sight—much as good chess players can see an inevitable 
checkmate several moves ahead of the actual event.98  But not all 
courts take the “checkmate” approach.   
So merger seems to say, if there are only a few ways of 
expressing something, then you can’t copyright any of them.  Now 
in the case of that beautiful chair that Orit showed, or those some-
attractive, some-unattractive espresso machines that she showed, 
clearly there are more than three or four ways to design them.  
Many particular espresso machines or chairs would, I think, pass a 
merger test.  But they may flunk separability. 
 
95  See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879). Baker is often seen as the 
birthplace of the merger doctrine: “[W]here the art [a book] teaches cannot be used 
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are 
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents 
to the art, and given therewith to the public . . . .” Id. at 103. 
 96 See generally id. at 101–02 (providing general information about what we now call 
the merger doctrine and idea/expression dichotomy); Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678–79 
(same).  
 97 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
 98 See id. at 678–79.    
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The tests for separability vary across federal jurisdictions.  I’d 
be glad to discuss the tests in detail during the question and answer 
session.  For now, let me mention two examples.  One type of 
approach  tracks the creator’s choices in making his design, asking 
whether changes were made to the design to serve a functional 
purpose.99  If so, it doesn’t matter if the affected feature also shows 
aesthetic intent, kill it, no copyright for it.100  The other approach, 
which I’ve already mentioned, implicitly asks if the aesthetic part 
of the object could be shaved off without impairing the object’s 
functionality.101  If it can, then copyright would be sustained.  If, 
on the other hand, removing the contested features would impair 
the object’s functionality, copyright in the features would be 
denied. 
Because it is often difficult for useful objects of industrial 
design to get protection as sculptures under copyright law,102 one 
might question whether copyright’s failure to protect most 
industrial design causes disincentives. In my view, American 
designers still predominantly follow the route of Form-Follows-
Function, instead of trying to pile flowery separable designs on top 
 
 99 For example, the court held that a bike rack, which originated as an artistic 
sculpture, was functional, and therefore not copyrightable, in part because the sculptor 
modified the original sculpture with the intent of making it a more efficient bicycle rack. 
See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 
1987).  
 100 See id. 
101 The Second Circuit in dicta suggested the grant of copyright to a belt buckle design 
was appropriate because, inter alia, “the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were not in 
any respect required by their utilitarian functions; the artistic and aesthetic features could 
. . . be conceived of as having been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise 
utilitarian article.” Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d  411, 419 (2d Cir. 
1985) (discussing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 
1980)).  The opinion concludes by defending the copyright in the belt buckle on this 
ground: that “a belt buckle can serve its function satisfactorily without any ornamentation 
of the type that renders the Kieselstein-Cord buckles distinctive.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 The copyright statute in defining “useful object” may be more concerned with 
copyright’s own internal limits than with deference to patent law.  Yet the language just 
quoted is protective of patent law: the court seems to place emphasis on whether the 
utilitarian article could exist and function independently without the added artwork.  By 
contrast, the statutory language instead asks if the aesthetic features can exist 
independently. 
102 I am speaking here of judicial approaches.  I have not examined Copyright Office 
practices. 
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of objects. That so many American designers have resisted the 
more easily-copyrightable route of “kitsch” suggests that design 
might continue to flourish as an aesthetic and important part of our 
economy whatever route copyright law chooses. Of course, the 
economic fate of designers depends on far more than just copyright 
law—notably, on business models, and on alternative sources of 
legal protection such as trademark law.103 
As you know, trademark law protects only “nonfunctional” 
product designs, and the definition of “functionality” is much 
debated.  At least until recently, an important factor was whether 
alternatives existed—if they did, a product design was likely to be 
found “nonfunctional.”104 Under the still influential Morton-
Norwich opinion,105 the key question was whether the design at 
issue was “the best or one of a few superior designs available?”106  
So long as many equally good design alternatives existed, under 
Morton-Norwich it looked like trademark law would protect a 
significant amount of industrial design. 
 In the recent Supreme Court case known as TrafFix, the 
relevance of alternative designs became more questionable. In 
TrafFix, a company that held expired utility patents in a dual 
spring design for holding signs against the wind sought to protect 
the design under trademark law, based on the claim that people 
 
103 See generally Dratler, supra note 43. 
104 “Since the effect upon competition ‘is really the crux of the matter,’ it is, of course, 
significant that there are other alternatives available.” In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 
F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (internal citations omitted).  Other factors mattered as 
well, but let us keep our eye on the issue of alternatives as part of the competitive-need 
standard, since the presence of alternatives can often favor claimants who argue for the 
nonfunctionality of their trade dress. See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 42, at 302 n.265 (“It 
is certainly true that a great many product or packaging features will be deemed non-
functional under a competitive need standard.”).   
 Admittedly, an inquiry into alternatives can itself be subject to significant variation. 
See, e.g., id. at 298–302 (arguing for a particular conception of alternatives). 
105  The  Morton-Norwich decision was approved as having continued applicability after 
TrafFix in Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 
discussed infra.  Thus, the Federal Circuit position is in disagreement with those courts 
that see TrafFix as “radically changing” the law of functionality. Thurmon, supra note 
42, at 246.  The Federal Circuit interpretation in Valu Engineering “is particularly 
significant because the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is bound by the 
decisions of the Federal Circuit on such issues.” Id. 
106   Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341. 
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recognized the dual spring design as source-identifying.107  The 
company apparently argued that despite the expired patent, 
competitors who want to use the dual spring design should at least 
make it look a little different to avoid confusing the public. New 
manufacturers of the sign-holding device could put a box around it, 
for example, to hide the dual springs, or use a different number of 
springs.108   
Under such an argument, the design’s trademark status might 
have been upheld if there were many possible competitive 
alternatives.109  And there is some appeal in such a view: if many 
ways exist for third parties to use an invention that had entered into 
the public domain, without the result looking exactly like the thing 
consumers had come to associate with a particular source, why not 
require new users of the invention to change the appearance a 
little?   
The Supreme Court refused to put this burden on the new 
manufacturers.110  The Court said: “A utility patent is strong 
evidence that the features therein claimed are functional.”111  
 “Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one 
who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy 
burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by 
showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary 
aspect of the device.”112  
Moreover, wrote the Court,  
Functionality having been established . . . .   
 
 107 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26–27 (2001). 
108 Id. at 33–34 (disapproving the court of appeals’ willingness to explore such 
alternatives). 
 109 See Brief for Respondent at 21, TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23 (No. 99-1571) (“[I]f a product 
feature has numerous alternatives (actual or theoretical) that serve the same useful 
purpose or provide the desired ornamental impression, then allowing the patentee to 
appropriate one design would not hinder competition in the relevant product market.  To 
the contrary, it would prevent others from depriving the trade dress owner of its 
investment and goodwill, and denying the public of a distinctive source identifier 
necessary for informed and effective competition.”).  
 110 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34. 
111 Id. at 29. 
112 Id. at 30. 
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 There is no need . . . to engage, as did the Court 
of Appeals, in speculation about other design 
possibilities, such as using three or four springs 
which might serve the same purpose . . . .  The dual-
spring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the 
configuration of MDI’s product; it is the reason the 
device works. Other designs need not be 
attempted.113 
Whether or not the design has a competitive advantage over 
other designs is irrelevant in the case where the design “is the 
reason the device works.”114  Even if there are many ways to avoid 
consumer confusion by covering the invention, or altering its 
appearance without impairing its usefulness, that’s irrelevant.115  If 
the design “is the reason the device works,”116 then at least in the 
presence of an expired utility patent, TrafFix says that trademark 
law must not enjoin copying by competitors.117 
TrafFix is immensely controversial, and may presage new 
possibilities for the development of trademark doctrine. The courts 
have gone in at least two different directions in interpreting 
TrafFix.  One of the approaches treats TrafFix as little altering the 
federal approach to functionality.  Another seems to take from 
TrafFix a test that remarkably resembles one version of the 
copyright separability test I’ve called the “shave-off” approach. 
The case that seems to see TrafFix  as making little change is 
Valu Engineering.118  At issue was the trademark status of a design 
for conveyor-belt guard rails.  In Valu Engineering, the influential 
Federal Circuit said that TrafFix doesn’t really mean what it seems 
to say; we can still use the old Morton-Norwich factors,119 one of 
which is “the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent 
 
113  Id. at 33–34 (citation omitted). 
 114 Id. at 33–34. 
 115 Id. at 34. 
116 Id. at 33. 
 117 See id. at 35. 
 118 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
119 Even under the Morton-Norwich approach, the court denied protection to the guide 
rail design, id. at 1279, a result the court would have almost certainly reached had it 
employed the TrafFix approach as interpreted by, e.g., the Eppendorf case described 
below.  If so, technically the case analysis is dicta. 
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designs.”120 That is, in Valu Engineering, the Federal Circuit said 
that alternative designs should continue to play a significant role in 
the analysis of functionality.121 
A few months later came a case called Eppendorf in the Fifth 
Circuit.122 The Eppendorf company manufactured both a popular 
dispenser syringe and pipette tips that would fit the syringe.123  A 
third party came along and made an allegedly confusingly similar 
set of pipettes which it sold at a lower price.124 That new 
manufacturer advertised that its pipettes could fit the Eppendorf 
syringe.125  Basically, it was a case of after-market sale of an object 
that was both competitive with, and compatible with, items in 
Eppendorf’s product line.126  Eppendorf alleged that many of its 
pipette features were distinctive and non-functional. 
 
120  Id. at 1274.  
 121 Id. at 1274 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 
(C.C.P.A. 1982)).  Wrote the Valu Engineering court: 
Nothing in TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative designs 
is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do not read the Court’s 
observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of alternative 
designs irrelevant.  Rather, we conclude that the Court merely noted 
that once a product feature is found functional based on other 
considerations there is no need to consider the availability of 
alternative designs, because the feature cannot be given trade dress 
protection merely because there are alternative designs available.  But 
that does not mean that the availability of alternative designs cannot 
be a legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a feature is 
functional in the first place.  
Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted). 
 There may be occasions when alternatives are important, but under TrafFix, those 
occasions do not include situations where the claimed distinctive feature is the “reason 
the device works.” 
 122 Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). 
 123 Id. at 353. 
124  Id. at 354 (noting that defendant’s pipette tips “were marketed as a ‘direct 
replacement’” for plaintiff’s pipette tips). 
 125 Id.  
126  As noted above, the crucial language in Valu Engineering  may be dicta.  The same 
may be true of the language in Eppendorf: had the Eppendorf court employed a 
competitive-necessity test, it might have come to the same result as it did using its strict 
interpretation of TrafFix.   
 Given the importance of the Eppendorf syringes in the market, the court could have 
found a competitive need to sell identical pipettes, so the pipettes could fit into the 
popular syringe holder.  Recognizing a trademark in Eppendorf pipettes, in other words, 
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To assess the features’ functionality, the court conceivably 
could have asked (as Morton-Norwich would have asked) if 
alternative designs existed for the claimed features which could do 
their job as well. The Eppendorf court refused to take this tack. It 
treated as irrelevant the expert testimony offered on the question of 
whether “[the design elements identified by Eppendorf] can be 
changed significantly, considerably without affecting the overall 
intended purpose.”127   
Instead, the court assessed whether the features were necessary 
to the product’s operation in the sense that, if the features were 
absent, the product would no longer function.128  Because 
removing the features would leave the device unable to work, the 
court ruled that all the features “are essential to the operation” of 
 
might have left little possibility of a low-cost alternative in that secondary market.  
(However, the opinion does not reveal whether the features of defendant’s pipettes that 
were similar to Eppendorf’s distinctive product features went further than necessary to 
make its pipettes functionally compatible with the Eppendorf syringe.)  
127  Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 358 (alteration in original); see also id. at 356 n.4 (“A 
product feature that satisfies [what TrafFix called] the traditional test for functionality is 
not shielded from functional status merely because the feature is not a competitive 
necessity.”). 
128  The court uses affirmative language such as “the flange is necessary,” id. at 358, but 
the opinion obviously means by “necessary” that the feature must be present in order for 
the object to function.  In my view, the same thought is better conveyed without overly 
burdening the word “necessary,” and instead inquiring directly into whether the absence 
of the item would affect the object’s functional operation.   
 The court used the following language:  
(1) The flange is necessary to connect the Combitip to the dispenser 
syringe; (2) The rings on the plunger head are necessary to lock the 
plunger into a cylinder in the dispenser syringe; (3) The plunger is 
necessary to push liquids out of the tip, and the ribs on the plunger 
stabilize its action; (4) The tips at the lower end of the Combitips are 
designed to easily fit into test tubes and other receptacles; (5) The 
size of the Combitip determines the dispensed volume, and size is 
essential to accurate and efficient dispensing; (6) The color scheme 
used on the Combitip-clear plastic with black lettering-enables the 
user easily to see and measure the amount of liquid in the Combitip, 
and black is standard in the medical industry; and (7) The stumps of 
the larger Combitips must be angled to separate air bubbles from the 
liquid and ensure that the full volume of liquid is dispensed.  Thus, 
all eight design elements identified by Eppendorf are essential to the 
operation of the Combitips.  
Id. 
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plaintiff’s pipette tips.129  Having come to this conclusion, the 
court concluded that “alternative designs are not germane.”130  
 For example, the court said that “the flange is necessary to 
connect . . . to the dispenser syringe;”131 that the plunger is 
necessary to “push liquids out of the tip;”132 and that the color 
scheme of clear plastic with black lettering (which the court noted 
was standard in the medical industry)133 was necessary to “see and 
measure the amount of liquid.”134  So all of these things were 
functional, concluded the court—regardless of whether there were 
alternative shapes or schemes that could have achieved the same 
task.135  Apparently because a pipette must have a flange, a plunger 
and lettering, all of those aspects were “functional.” 
 This analysis is remarkably similar to that of the Second 
Circuit in the Carol Barnhart copyright case. There the court 
found “no separability” in the design of mannequin torsos. Wrote 
the court:   
the features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., 
the life-size configuration of the breasts and the 
width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined 
with the utilitarian feature, the display of clothes. . . 
.  [A] model of a human torso, in order to serve its 
utilitarian function, must have some configuration 
of the chest and some width of shoulders.136  
Thus, the chest and shoulder designs are not “separable.” 
 
129 Id. 
130   Id.  Although the presence of expired patents might arguably have been essential to 
the TrafFix opinion, the Eppendorf opinion does not mention whether the pipettes had 
ever been patented.  The court instead focuses on the question of whether a feature “is the 
reason the device works.” Id. at 355, 357 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001)). 
131  Id. at 358. 
 132 Id. 
133  To achieve protection under the Lanham Act, an object must be nonfunctional and 
distinctive (source-identifying). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127 (2006).  The court may have 
been intimating its doubts about the distinctiveness of the lettering.  
 134 Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 358. 
 135 See id.  
136  Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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Thus to resolve a trademark functionality dispute, the 
Eppendorf court might be said to have used a strict, Carol 
Barnhart type version of what we call the separability test in 
copyright.137  The Eppendorf court saw that kind of approach as its 
warrant from TrafFix.  
So what lessons can we draw from these developments?  One 
possibility is this.  After TrafFix, it appears that trademark courts 
have the option of following copyright’s lead, and could employ a 
separability-type “shaving-off” test that would leave many more 
objects open for copying. Perhaps we can use the existing 
copyright and trademark cases as a sort of laboratory from which 
to gain some empirical data on whether this would be a good route 
to follow.  Despite the differences in the goals served by copyright 
and trademark respectively, both regimes seek to avoid conflict 
with patent law. The costs and benefits of “separability” in its 
various versions, is worth comparing with “functionality” in its 
various guises, particularly at the two extremes I have highlighted: 
the copyright cases that hinge on how an object would function if 
the aesthetics were shaved away, and the trademark cases that 
hinge on whether the appearance of a distinctive object could be 
altered (or an alternative found) without impairing functionality. 
Thank you. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Next we have Mark Janis, who is a Professor of Law and Ira C.  
Batman Faculty Fellow at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana 
University.  It took a title that long, by the way, to lure him away 
from Iowa where he was also a distinguished Chair until quite 
recently. 
Mark teaches and writes in the areas of patent, trademark and 
unfair competition, and IP and antitrust.  So he comes at this a little 
more from an industrial property perspective.  He is well-published 
in law reviews, of course, but also has a special gift for the kind of 
writing, that on any other panel but this one, I would call useful. 
 
137  As mentioned, the resemblance is perhaps most clear in the approach to separability 
taken by Carol Barnhart.  
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That is to say, he’s written a casebook that a lot of you have 
studied from, Trademarks & Unfair Competition; he’s also the 
author of a couple volume treatise on IP and Antitrust.  What I’m 
most excited about is his forthcoming book on Trade Dress and 
Design Law.  So without further ado, Mark. 
PROF. JANIS: 
Thank you for the introduction.  Thanks, it’s always nice to be 
here at Fordham. 
I’m going to talk about design patent law, the oldest form of 
design protection law, at least in the U.S., but also the least 
evolved.  Design patent law is largely derivative of utility patent 
law for better or worse.  The derivation hasn’t always been very 
smooth, leading some to attempt to draw analogies to trademark, to 
copyright. 
What I’d like to do is talk a little bit about some recent 
doctrinal developments in design patent law, but mainly for the 
purpose of asking an overarching question, which is, has the patent 
model for design protection really proven to be all that successful? 
My objective is not really to denigrate the design patent 
system, though in some ways that would be easy to do. My 
objective really is to ask whether there might be a way to make the 
design patent system ease away from its “patentness.” 
So I want to start by addressing the question from a historical 
perspective.  What were we thinking?  Why did we decide to adopt 
a patent model for design protection?  There are many ways that 
one could explain it. 
My way may be a little bit frivolous here, but really the main 
reasons I brought the slides was so I could show you a picture of 
Henry Ellsworth.  I think that there’s a fair argument to be made 
that the main reason that we adopted a patent model for designs 
was because Henry Ellsworth wanted it.138 
 
 138 Henry Leavitt Ellsworth (1791–1858) was largely responsible for the development 
of the business of the United States Patent Office. See generally FRANKLIN BOWDITCH 
DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS 
OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY 6, at 309–12 (Yale Univ. Press 1912). 
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He was a politically powerful guy at the time, happened to be 
the patent commissioner.139  In a report in 1841 to the Congress, he 
said, essentially as you can see from the excerpt there, “Give me 
the authority to grant patents for these objects, designs.”140  And he 
says, “This could happen simply by authorizing me to issue patents 
under the same limitations and on the same conditions as govern 
the present action in other cases.”141 
Now, how simple was that really?  In 1841 or 1842, when 
Congress did take his advice and passed a statute very similar to 
the language of his report,142 the limitations and conditions that he 
would have had in mind are really quite different than the ones that 
we would have in mind today. 
So, for example, at the time, there was no developed doctrine 
of obviousness in utility patent law.143  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood144 
had not been decided.  There was not a developed claim drafting 
practice either. 
Certainly, we didn’t have the set of tools for defining claim 
scope that we now have in utility patent law.145  One other thing: 
the Ellsworth letter refers to the word “useful” in connection with 
some categories of designs, suggesting that those designs could be 
protected only if they possessed utility.146  While the utility patent 
law did contain a utility requirement at the time,147 and design 
patent law could have drawn upon it, that notion seems rather 
 
 139 See id. at 310. 
 140  HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 74 (1842).   
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 U.S.C. § 
102], if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.”); see also CHISUM, supra note 5, § 1:OV.2. 
 144 52 U.S. 248 (1851). 
 145 See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 146  HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 74 (1842).  
 147 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2010  2:43 PM 
2010] IP PROTECTION FOR DESIGN 819 
strange for design protection, where we’re usually interested in 
ensuring non-functionality, rather than functionality. 
So the patent model that Henry Ellsworth had in mind really 
was necessarily quite different than the patent model that we have 
today for designs.  Indeed, some of the doctrines that have been 
most troublesome in design patent law are the very ones that I have 
just mentioned: obviousness, claim scope, and non-functionality. 
I now want to explore those doctrines a bit to ask the following 
question: have these doctrines been troublesome just because 
patent law is difficult and its doctrines aren’t always pure, or have 
these doctrines been difficult for a common reason, that the patent 
model, at least as we know it today, isn’t a very good fit for 
protecting design? 
So let me start with obviousness and detail a couple of debates 
that have arisen recently with respect to design patent obviousness. 
First, I would suggest that the very idea of applying the utility 
patent doctrine of obviousness to designs is a challenging concept 
to grasp.  I take comfort in the fact that I have some good company 
in that: Judge Rich. 
The design patent obviousness requirement comes to design 
patents implicitly through this incorporation clause in § 171,148 
written by Judge Rich,149 who also wrote § 103.150 
But if you actually tried to follow the statute applying § 103, 
which Judge Rich wrote, by way of § 171, which he wrote, that 
was difficult.  He complained about it himself, “Applying 
obviousness to designs is impossible,” he said in his concurring 
opinion in the Nalbandian case.151 
In very typical, Judge Rich fashion, he went on in that 
concurring opinion to say, “And let me just tell you something 
about the writing of the patent statute, which by the way, I was 
 
 148 Id. § 171. 
 149 Giles S. Rich served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
from 1956 until his death in 1999. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Giles S. Rich, Oldest Active 
Federal Judge, Dies at 95, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at A13; see also James F. Davis, 
Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 8. 
 150 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 151 In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218–19 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring). 
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responsible for in part. What we decided to do was throw in this 
incorporation clause, knowing that obviousness was going to be a 
problem, and come back to it later.  And we never have, and this is 
the problem.”152 
He went on in this opinion to say, “And by the way, there’ve 
been 70 odd,” maybe at the time 40 or 50 odd, “legislative 
proposals for comprehensive design patent protection.  The bar 
should be behind those.”153 
Judge Rich was surely right that obviousness is difficult to 
apply to designs, and perhaps he was right that obviousness was 
never really intended to endure over the long term as a requirement 
for design protection.  Compounding that, the law of obviousness 
in utility patents has been pretty volatile.  And further 
compounding that, the law of design patents outside of 
obviousness has been pretty volatile in ways that affect design 
patent obviousness,  and that’s just starting to show up in the court 
decisions. 
Consider, for example, the ordinary-observer test versus the 
ordinary-designer test.  Utility patent law says that obviousness is 
measured through the eyes of a person of ordinary skill in the 
art.154  Design patent law, after some controversy played out in the 
Nalbandian case, now says that obviousness is to be measured 
through the eyes of the ordinary designer.155  These propositions 
sound consistent. 
The problem comes in that infringement in design patents has 
always been measured through the eyes of the ordinary observer, 
first in Gorham v. White156 and then more recently, in the Egyptian 
Goddess157 case, which reestablished a version of the ordinary-
observer test as the dominant test. 
Perhaps symmetry between utility patent obviousness and 
design patent obviousness should be the objective, or perhaps 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1219 n.1. 
 154 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).  
 155 Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1216. 
 156 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872).  
 157 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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symmetry between design patent obviousness and design patent 
infringement is more important.  Either way, the issue seems to be 
puzzling to courts at the highest level.  Recently, in the Titan 
Tire158 case, the issue did come up, and here’s what the Federal 
Circuit had to say about it.  Now, in fairness to the Federal Circuit, 
they probably didn’t have to resolve this legal question in order to 
decide the case, which may explain the ambivalent rhetoric.  The 
Federal Circuit said that its Egyptian Goddess opinion was directed 
to design patent infringement (of course), and particularly to 
reestablishing the ordinary observer test for design patent 
infringement.159  Then the Federal Circuit proceeded to say that 
“It’s not clear to what extent, if any, the doctrine applicable to 
obviousness should be modified to conform to that approach.”160  
Perhaps the court was right to avoid plunging into dicta.  But 
sometimes these sorts of statements can be frustrating, particularly 
in the area of design patents, where the number of cases is limited.  
Who is going to tell us what is clear, if not the Federal Circuit? 
The issue of symmetry between design patent obviousness and 
utility patent obviousness also arose in the Titan Tire case.  The 
main point of controversy here concerns the teaching-suggestion-
motivation test, and the distinction between rigid and flexible 
applications of that test.161 
Here is the Federal Circuit’s version of the teaching-suggestion 
-motivation test as applied to design patents, as recited in the 
Durling v. Spectrum Furniture162 case.  An obviousness 
combination requires a primary reference, “the design 
characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed 
design,”163 and secondary references sufficiently related to the 
primary reference “that the appearance of certain ornamental 
features in one would suggest the application of those features to 
 
 158 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 159 Id. at 1384. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 1380–81. 
 162 Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“More 
specifically the inquiry is whether one of ordinary skill would have combined teachings 
of the prior art to create the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.”). 
 163 Id. 
C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2010  2:43 PM 
822 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:783 
the other.”164  There are lots of requirements for the primary 
reference and for the secondary references.  That strikes me as 
being really quite rigid. 
That might be problematic because in KSR International Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc.,165 a utility patent case of course, the Supreme Court 
clearly rejected a rigid view of the teaching-suggestion-motivation 
test.166  Should that same reasoning apply in the design patent 
context?  In the Titan Tire case, the Federal Circuit was a little coy 
on the point. The court said that design patents “like utility patents, 
must meet the nonobviousness requirement”167 and then said “it is 
not obvious that the Supreme Court necessarily intended to 
exclude design patents from the reach of KSR.”168 
I take away from this just a lingering question. Maybe this 
struggle is symptomatic of a larger problem in that we’re trying to 
fit this utility patent model to designs and maybe that just was an 
awkward thing all the way along. 
Now, consider the inquiry into design patent claim scope.  Here 
we have the Gorham v. White standard, the famous ordinary-
observer standard for patent infringement of a design.169  One thing 
to notice about this test is that it really is not very analogous to 
modern utility patent infringement law at all.  Perhaps, even then, 
the Court was resisting the patent analogy.  The Gorham standard 
has more in common with modern trademark law, with its 
references to deception of observers and product diversion and so 
forth.170 
In Egyptian Goddess, the en banc Federal Circuit discarded the 
point-of-novelty test and reinstalled a version of the ordinary-
 
 164 Id. 
 165 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 166 Id. at 427. 
 167 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 168 Id. at 1385. 
 169 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (“[I]n the eye of an ordinary 
observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially 
the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to 
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the 
other.”). 
 170 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (defining the likelihood of confusion standard of 
infringement as “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”). 
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observer test, where the ordinary observer is capable of comparing 
the claimed design with the accused design against the backdrop of 
prior art designs.171  We could argue about whether the Federal 
Circuit’s decision makes the standard more like a patent standard, 
or perhaps just something that is sui generis. 
But in another part of its opinion, the court clearly moved away 
from the patent analogy.  That part speaks about claim 
construction—a central exercise in any modern utility patent 
litigation—and there were lots of questions in design patent cases 
about whether the design patent claim, which is defined by the 
drawings, needs to be construed in words. 
In the relevant part of the Egyptian Goddess decision, the 
Federal Circuit answered those questions by saying that claim 
construction in words ordinarily should not be undertaken in a 
design patent case because it’s too difficult.172 I think too difficult 
probably meant, usually too narrowing. 
But the Federal Circuit also said that “the trial court could 
usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number of other 
issues that bear on the scope of the claim;”173 and the court  listed 
the issues: “describing the role of particular conventions in design 
patent drafting;”174 “describing the effect of any representations 
that may have been made in the course of the prosecution 
history;”175 and “distinguishing between those features of the 
claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely 
functional.”176 
We should wonder what’s going on here.  The Federal Circuit 
has backed away from the central focus of utility patent 
infringement litigation claim construction, perhaps because it just 
isn’t a very good fit for litigating design patents.  But did it really 
mean also to discard the accompanying tools of claim construction 
altogether?  Did it really mean to make them merely optional? 
 
 171 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 172 Id. at 679–80. 
 173 Id. at 680. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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For example, what if a design patent applicant makes limiting 
statements about the meaning of its claim in the prosecution 
history.  Is it optional to take those into account?  Or is the court 
required to take that into account? 
What about other canons of claim construction?  Do claims 
have to be assessed the same way for validity as for infringement, 
for example?  That seems very central to concepts of patent law.  
Here we have a district court in International Seaway Trading 
Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.177 saying, “I’m not so sure that I do need 
to do that.”  I really think this has to be wrong.178 
So, again, are these just the sort of ordinary doctrinal issues 
that have to be worked through?  It may be so. 
But might they also indicate something about the robustness of 
a patent model for designs?  I think the latter. 
Finally, let me talk a little bit about functionality.  A doctrine 
that takes us firmly away from any utility patent analogy, of 
course. 
Consider the acronym, FUBAR.  FUBAR, which I understand 
to mean “Fouled up beyond any recognition.”  That’s what my 
mother told me anyway.  But it also stands for “Functional utility 
bar.”  Let me just ask you, if you are representing a defendant in a 
design patent case, wouldn’t you love it if your accused device was 
named the functional utility bar?  Perfect.  Perfect. 
That’s Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.179  This will be an 
interesting case to watch, decided in the District of Arizona, and 
pending at the Federal Circuit.  In fact, the oral arguments are 
coming up here in a couple of weeks.  It is a case that could go 
away quietly or it could involve some really important issues in 
design patent.180 
 
 177 599 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 178 Shortly after the Symposium, the Federal Circuit decided on appeal in International 
Seaway that courts must assess anticipation in the same way that they assess 
infringement: the point-of-novelty analysis should be discarded for anticipation, just as it 
was discarded for infringement, and only the ordinary observer test applies. Int’l Seaway 
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 179 610 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
180  After the Symposium, the Federal Circuit decided Richardson on appeal. Richardson 
v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that it was 
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It may go away quietly if the court thinks that the claimed and 
accused devices, illustrated here, just don’t look very similar to an 
ordinary observer.  And maybe they don’t. 
So maybe it’s possible to dispose of this case without really 
any high-level legal analysis.  That’s not the way the case is 
framed though.  The case has been framed as a case all about 
functionality.181  The plaintiff says that you have to look at the 
overall appearance of the design in assessing functionality.182  The 
defendant urges the court to look at individual features, attribute de 
facto functions to them, and filter those out in determining 
infringement.183 
There is a problem currently with the way this issue is 
structured in design patents, although I won’t have time to discuss 
the issue in depth.  There is Federal Circuit law saying that as a 
matter of claim construction, you should filter out functional 
features,184 which sounds consistent with a lot of design law and 
gives some support to the defendant’s position. 
On the other hand, Egyptian Goddess seems to strike a contrary 
theme.  The court in Egyptian Goddess discarded the point-of- 
novelty test on the ground that it lent too much attention to 
individual features.185  So there’s a real tension here that this case 
about the FUBAR brings up, at least as the case is briefed. 
I’ll pass over my ideas on how that tension should be resolved, 
and instead conclude by noting that these sorts of disputes do raise, 
for me, questions about the robustness of the patent analogy and do 
suggest to me that we really ought to think about moving away 
from that analogy—easing away from obviousness, easing away 
 
proper for the lower court to filter out functional elements as part of the exercise of claim 
construction).  Richardson and related developments are explored in more detail in 
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS & DESIGN LAW chs. 5–6 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 181 Richardson, 610 F. Supp. at 105152. 
 182 Id. at 1052. 
 183 Id. at 105253. 
 184 Id. at 1051 (quoting Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 185 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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from claims, and overall, easing away from a patent analogy.  So 
I’m past my time, let me sit down, thank you for your attention. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
And finally, we have Jonathan Moskin, who is kind enough to 
join us from Foley and Lardner.  He’s a Partner and a member of 
the Litigation, Trademark, Copyright and Advertising, Privacy, 
and Security & Information Management Practices.  In other 
words, he wears a lot of IP-related hats. 
Jonathan is currently Chair of the New York Intellectual 
Property Law Association’s Privacy Law Committee and has, in 
the past, served as Chairman of the New York Intellectual Property 
Law Association’s Internet Law and Design Protection 
Committees. 
Jonathan also does a great deal of editorial and writing work, as 
editor of The Trademark Reporter, as a member of the Editorial 
Board of the Intellectual Property Strategist and also an Editorial 
Board Member for the Queen Mary Studies in IP Law and Policy 
Series. 
In other words, Jonathan, as I always think of him, is really an 
academic in practitioner’s clothing.  But let’s face it, that’s usually 
much nicer clothing.  So, welcome, Jonathan. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
You are the only person, I think, who’s ever complimented me 
on my clothing. 
So I have to say, after listening to the previous three speakers, 
as well as the speakers early this morning, on Bilski, I really have 
no idea what I want to tell you. 
I will say that last night, I was speaking with my former 
partner, Jim Dabney.  He raised the question, well, what do these 
two topics have to do with one another?  One theme that has not 
yet emerged from the other panelists, but I do think really does 
unite the discussion earlier this morning about Bilski as well as the 
discussion we’re having now, is the concern that all aspects of 
intellectually property law share for not impinging too much on 
competition.  So the anti-trust flip-side of the coin of intellectual 
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property protection is not overextending the limited monopolies 
that are granted. 
I really think that if you look at some of the cases, and I’ll walk 
you through some of them, what you’ll see is that to some extent, I 
think that what courts are struggling with and what we have been 
struggling with in defining what is functional and how to limit 
protection for the trade risk rights, stems from that, that these are 
all related concepts. 
I’ve identified some of the main concepts that bear on this 
issue.  Many of these have already been addressed, so what I’ll 
really do is instead of focusing on these now, is just walk you 
through some history.  This is the Two Pesos186 case in the 
Supreme Court, which is often cited as the “High-water mark of 
design protection under trademark law, under the Lanham Act,” 
and you can see these look like just two large, almost generic 
Mexican or Tex-Mex restaurants, a very unlikely subject matter for 
the Supreme Court to announce very broad doctrine that it was 
going to protect trade dress rights and the appearance, the overall 
or outwards appearance of these restaurants.187 
Yet this is in fact what the Supreme Court did and I won’t 
dwell on all of the language here, you can read the slide yourself, 
but what the Court rejected here was a requirement that the 
claimed trade dress owner prove secondary meaning,188 that as 
long as the restaurant, and again you tell me if you think there’s 
something inherently distinctive about these, as long as there was a 
sufficient inherent distinctiveness to the claimed trade dress, that’s 
good enough, at least as of 1992.189 
Continuing in this trend, although there were some limitations 
that the Supreme Court imposed in the Qualitex190 case, here too, a 
color by itself was deemed protectable as trade dress191 and I 
think—I know I’ve been practicing in this field for quite awhile—
many people in the field assumed at this point in time that virtually 
 
 186 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 187 Id. at 76566. 
 188 Id. at 775. 
 189 Id. at 776. 
 190 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 191 Id. at 161. 
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any type of trade dress could be protectable.  There were 
protections being extended to sound marks and all sorts of other 
things at this time,192 oh, well, here, for another example, part of 
the same general time period, the design of Ferrari, which had long 
since ceased being in production.  A car kit company was making 
reproductions of it and it was still deemed to be protectable as an 
indication of source and therefore protectable under the Lanham 
Act.193 
You’ll come to see more recently, as the law has changed, that 
just a couple of years ago, the Massachusetts Federal Court had a 
case involving the Shelby Cobra design and for some of the 
reasons we’ll now discuss, and came to the very conclusion that 
the Cobra design, no matter how distinctive it was, wasn’t 
protectable.194 
So what is the underlying concept, or limiting concept, that the 
courts have wrestled with?  That’s whether the design in question 
is identifiable to consumers and identifies the source of the 
product. 
That’s a very tricky thing to answer.  In the case that marked 
the change in the law, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers 
Inc.,195 the designs were these appliqués to children’s clothing.196  
Interesting, because this case involved copyright as well as trade 
dress, the plaintiff won on both theories below and the Supreme 
Court reversed, but only on the trade dress claim.197  In language 
that has since bedeviled this field, the Court focused on the fact, 
well, does this really identify the source of the product or is it just 
a design?198  If it’s a design, then, sure, it can be protected under 
copyright, but not under trademark.199 
 
 192 For example, Anheuser-Busch was granted federal registration for the sound of a 
howling wolf used in beer commercials. Jeffery S. Edelstein & Cathy L. Leuders, Recent 
Developments in Trade Dress Infringement Law, 40 IDEA 105, 122 (2000).   
 193 Ferrari S.p.A Esercizio Fabbriche Auto. E Corse v. McBurnie Coachcraft, Inc., No. 
86-1812-B, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16314, at *810 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1988). 
 194 Shelby v. Superformance Int’l, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 983, 987 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 195 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 196 Id. at 207–08. 
 197 Id. at 216. 
 198 See id. at 212–15. 
 199 Id. at 214. 
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Essentially, what I think the court was wrestling with is the 
design, is it a symbol of origin?  Does it identify source?  If so, 
how do you prove that?  Or is it the thing itself?  If it’s the thing 
itself, then we have to be very careful about how we protect it. 
I’m not a classics scholar, but I have put down here a quote 
from Umberto Eco, defining what we mean by a symbol anyway.  I 
think it really is part of the conceptual struggle here, there is no 
absent half when the thing itself is what you’re talking about 
protecting as a design, as a trademark, or trade dress. 
Some of you may be—I don’t know if they teach Sigmund 
Freud any longer in college, but as Freud, who was considered, I 
suppose, the master of what were the meanings of symbols, even 
he recognized that sometimes a good cigar is just a good cigar. 
That was a joke, by the way, but looking back to the definition 
in the statute itself, what is a trademark?  The Lanham Act 
specifically calls out that it has to be a source-indicating symbol.200  
It has to identify and distinguish the goods of the merchant.201  So 
it is unlike, I think, the questions that were just assumed in the Two 
Pesos case, there is a very tough question.  Is it distinctive?  Is it 
just inherently distinctive;202 the kind of thing that we might think 
of as being protectable under copyright?  Or does it serve this other 
function?  Is it somehow, even though it’s all part of the thing 
itself, is it representing some absent half?  Is there some other 
secondary meaning?  Is there some other broader significance that 
it has and how do we disentangle these questions? 
Now, following the Samara Brothers decision, Congress 
stepped in and essentially created a presumption that trade dress, 
trade dress generally, and not simply the thing itself, is 
functional.203  I went back this morning, because I was puzzled 
about this, and looked at the Samara Brothers decision itself, and 
was interested in what Justice Scalia said—in looking at those, I 
don’t think I need to go back to the slide of the children’s 
clothing—which was that “consumers should not be deprived of 
 
 200 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 201 Id.  
 202 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
 203 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).  
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the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and 
aesthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves.”204  He 
was grouping together the utilitarian and the aesthetic. 
Although the Samara Brothers case has been cited in the 
increasingly muddy discussion, the Supreme Court meant to bar 
protection for aesthetically functional products or designs.  I think 
he was certainly throwing all these things together because of the 
anti-competitive nature of extending protection too broadly to 
product designs. 
Congress seems to have taken that lead by, as I say, creating a 
presumption that all product designs, not simply the thing itself, 
but any types of trade dress are presumptively functional.205  I 
think in using the same broad term, “functional” in the same broad 
way that Justice Scalia was using it in the Samara Brothers case, 
such an approach does not distinguish between utilitarian 
functionality and aesthetic functionality, but rather embraces a 
broader concern about not extending anti-competitive rights that 
prevent people from making products that are useful for all of us. 
Now I don’t really want to spend too much time on 
distinguishing trade dress concerns from copyright and patent.  The 
two other speakers, Professor Gordon and Professor Janis, have 
already gone into much greater length than I could possibly do on 
that, but the difficulties, I think, exist in how we distinguish these 
features from one another.  I was speaking with one of the speakers 
this morning about how the Supreme Court was going to decide 
the Bilski case.  His comment, and I hate to quote somebody who’s 
not even here any longer, about an off-the-record comment he 
made, was, “Well, sheet music certainly couldn’t be patentable, 
that’s protected by copyright.” 
But what if the sheet music served as a sort of therapeutic 
function to improve one’s mood or as a cure for depression?  I 
recited to him, a very recent book by Oliver Sacks who goes on at 
great length about the benefits of music in just this way. 
 
 204 Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 213. 
 205 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3). 
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Now, if there was such a therapeutic benefit to a piece of sheet 
music, now would that also then make it ineligible for copyright 
protection?  I also want to mention that on the issue of design 
protection, one of the really fundamental problems is not just in 
defining what is the proper test for ornamentality or infringement, 
but also the fact that the courts have construed design patents to 
have literally no scope.  There is a practical problem that—I know 
I litigated one design patent case up to the Federal Circuit, and 
although we won, it’s very difficult, and I’ve concluded, very 
difficult to protect design patents in any meaningful way. 
I have included in the materials, an article, which suggests—
somewhat inspired by that litigation, but for other broader 
reasons—that one way to make design patents more relevant is 
really to take the Supreme Court and the Gorham case at its word 
and start treating these cases more like trademark or copyright 
cases and find out what ordinary observers think.206  Conduct 
consumer surveys; there have been almost no such surveys 
conducted in design patent cases,207 which I find remarkable.  I 
suspect that’s really more a function of the way the law is 
practiced, namely that design patent cases are often litigated by 
patent lawyers, whereas trademark cases are litigated by trademark 
lawyers and there aren’t very many people like me who, well, 
litigate all sorts of cases and think that, as Professor Scafidi said at 
the outset, this is all somehow part of what we call intellectual 
property law. 
Again, Professor Gordon discussed the Dastar case at greater 
length.  I won’t dwell on it.  But I will just say that there’s a certain 
irony in the Supreme Court’s language that there is this “carefully 
crafted bargain.”208  I think it says, I think, one thing, if you 
conclude nothing else from today’s discussion, that it really is a 
mess. 
Demonstrating, again, just briefly, why this is all so difficult to 
apply, here’s a picture from a recent Second Circuit decision in 
 
 206 Moskin, supra note 27, at 702. 
 207 Id. at 703. 
 208 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (quoting 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)). 
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which, again, not unlike the Samara Brothers case, the court said 
that the Yurman Design was protectable under copyright, but not 
under trademark.209 
The issue of copyright protection was not addressed on appeal, 
and at the risk of making the obvious pun, had it been addressed, I 
frankly wonder how the court would have disentangled the 
separate strands that are shown here, with copyright protection as 
distinct from trademark protection. 
The case did begin to enunciate some very tough tests that have 
been followed since, including in the case that’s shown here.  By a 
show of hands, would any of you care to guess whether this design 
is protectable as trade dress? 
Anyone say yes?  Who thinks it is protectable? 
Well, we have two.  The rest of you all, you think it’s not? 
Well, in fact, the Southern District, fairly recently, actually 
very recently, held that it’s not.210  These are some of the factors 
that the court looked at.  Again, how I don’t think the right hand 
necessarily knows what the left hand is doing, but if you look at 
some of the factors that the court insisted, even as a matter of 
pleading, that the plaintiff show, and this probably comes from the 
Yurman case, as well as an earlier Second Circuit case, the 
Landscape Forms211 decision, what the court is requiring is 
something not unlike a mark-and-tie test where if you’re claiming 
 
 209 See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110–18 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 210  Heller, Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1909, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71991, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009). 
 211 Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“Nonetheless, focus on the overall look of a product does not permit a plaintiff to 
dispense with an articulation of the specific elements which comprise its distinct dress. 
Without such a precise expression of the character and scope of the claimed trade dress, 
litigation will be difficult, as courts will be unable to evaluate how unique and 
unexpected the design elements are in the relevant market. Courts will also be unable to 
shape narrowly-tailored relief if they do not know what distinctive combination of 
ingredients deserves protection. Moreover, a plaintiff's inability to explain to a court 
exactly which aspects of its product design(s) merit protection may indicate that its claim 
is pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the claimant seeks protection for an 
unprotectable style, theme or idea.”).  
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rights and trade dress, you now have to articulate all of the 
elements that you believe are protectable.212 
The reason the court has said, not just this court, but other 
courts have said this—this brings me back to the other theme that I 
think unites a lot of these, the discussion that we’ve had this 
morning, in putting on Bilski—it’s the anti-competitive nature of 
overextending rights in these designs.  The court was clearly very 
worried that if we’re going to give rights in a trade dress design, 
the claimed trade dress owner has to be able to tell us exactly what 
it is he is claiming, in which he is claiming protection, and if he 
can’t, he won’t get protection.213 
I guess I’ll just skip over this, but one of the other parts of the 
concern here, I’ll very, very quickly mention, also limiting rights 
and trade dress, is since source indication is such a troubling, 
difficult notion when you’re talking about the thing itself, the 
courts have also, and this is just one example, said, well, fine, you 
may have a distinctive bottle shape here, but you need to tell 
people where it comes from.  Doesn’t that solve all of your 
concerns about source indication?  That indeed is what the Second 
Circuit has said,214 and again, this is the principle enunciated by 
the Second Circuit, this includes extensive discussions about not 
overextending the Lanham Act to make it an anti-competitive body 
of law. 
So thank you very much. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
As our panelists return to the dais, a quick recommendation for 
after we adjourn for the day.  Chairs seem to be on the agenda for 
today and we’re just a few blocks from the Museum of Art and 
Design, which at the moment has some really cool chairs on 
exhibit.  So you could go test the theory of whether it’s all just 
American kitsch or not. 
All right.  Let us begin our Q&A session, perhaps by my 
suggesting to the moderators and panelists that they address one 
 
 212 See Heller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71991, at *14–17. 
 213 See id. 
 214 See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
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another briefly.  Orit has put a very clear suggestion on the table 
that one way to fix the problem is, and I summarize here, to move 
from the copyright perspective and allow registration of even 
things that may very well be functional, with the reservation that 
this can be determined later, at the point of an infringement action. 
 Now, Mark, and implicitly Jonathan, I think, have endorsed 
something a little different and that is making design patents less 
patent-like, which is another possibility for how to try to resolve an 
issue like this.  So I wonder if you all could address one another’s 
proposals and also, Wendy and Jonathan, you could take a look, 
from the criticisms that you’ve made or comments that you’ve 
made, at those proposals and tell us what you think. 
PROF. GORDON: 
Well, I have a very small point to make.  I learned an awful lot 
from Jonathan, and now I think I have a small contribution for you.  
Remember, the Yurman bracelets, about which you made the 
entangling separability joke? 
I don’t think the bracelets would be “useful articles” to begin 
with, so I don’t think I have to worry about separability. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Well, if by that standard, then I don’t necessarily disagree with 
you, but I think in keeping with a long tradition in the law, clothing 
has also been deemed to be functional, utilitarian.  There’s a lot 
one could say here.  I think abstract designs are particularly 
difficult to protect under copyright because it’s so hard to separate 
out conceptually what’s unique about the design from—unlike a 
figurative element, a simple example, the Mazer v. Stein swan, in 
the Yurman bracelet. 
PROF.  GORDON: 
It was a Balinese dancer in Mazer.215 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Was it? 
PROF. GORDON: 
 
 215 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954). 
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Yes.  It was very swan-like though. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Caryatid actually.  A classical carved figure carrying 
something on her head 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Anyway, we don’t need to digress. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Yes. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Quite that far. 
But I think it’s very difficult to disentangle those strands and 
the history—essentially all fashion is inherently functional, 
because it’s meant to be worn. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
And yet jewelry—Wendy’s correct, jewelry is treated 
differently and subject to copyright.  Strangely, strangely you’re 
right.  Because it still has to fit the body. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Right. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Yes.  Great point. 
So? 
MR. MOSKIN: 
I will, if I can, jump in on that.  There is, since I was talking 
about anti-competitive concerns, the thing that really jumped out at 
me, a concern about just giving registrations and then let the 
parties fight it out later, is precisely what the Supreme Court said 
in the Samara Brothers case, and Justice Scalia was very explicit, 
he wanted to limit the anti-competitive effects of giving protection 
and he wanted to create a bright line so that parties couldn’t file 
anti-competitive lawsuits that would run up enormous bills and one 
could then use the leverage of litigation itself to establish effective 
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intellectual property rights, where they were not inherently worthy 
of being protected.216 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
But I think that—anyway, this is the situation with copyright.  I 
think that design is a branch of copyright law and copyright law 
reacts in the same way.  I mean, there’s no registration, or at least 
the registration is not compulsory.217  Rather, it is needed in order 
to file a suit.218  Then you go to court and challenge open 
standards, such as whether the work is original and whether there 
is substantial similarity, etc.  I think there’s no difference between 
these kinds of standards and the non-functionality standard. 
PROF. JANIS: 
Let me jump in and say that I’ve known Wendy for a long 
time, this is the first time I’ve ever seen her perform the Balinese 
dancer, I’m going to remember that. 
One reaction to the proposal about functionality, I need to 
understand a little better, I’m looking forward to reading the paper.  
But one thing I’m struck by is the fact that in some ways that’s the 
way that functionality is already being applied.  You could take 
design patents, for example, where in theory there’s an 
examination, in theory there would be an examination of 
functionality and there would be a discussion of functionality from 
a validity perspective219 and then there would be another 
discussion, perhaps, from an infringement perspective.220 
But in fact, there isn’t much prosecution in design patents.  So 
in fact, what you describe may be very close to what is already 
going on, at least in the design patent area, quite possibly others, so 
I would want to think more about your proposal and how it fits 
really with what’s currently going on. 
 
 216 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000). 
 217 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). 
 218 Id. § 411(a). 
 219 See, e.g., Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (invalidating design patents on the basis of functionality). See generally 
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 180, at ch. 5 (discussing functionality as a design patent 
validity doctrine). 
 220  See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294–96 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(discussing functionality in the context of an infringement allegation). 
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PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
I agree.  I think that I have just described what is going on in 
reality, and I’m putting this reality “on the table.” 
PROF. JANIS: 
Yes. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
Start with this pattern design, there is no registration, there is 
no prosecution, it’s a deposit and nothing more.  I personally think 
that also deposits should be eliminated. 
It should be a kind of short term copyright, for ten years, and it 
is in accordance with TRIPS.221 
By the way, I think that in the 1976 U.S. copyright bill, there 
was a chapter suggesting this kind of a short-term copyright for 
designs.222  However, at the last minute it was taken off by 
Congress, and I don’t know why.  I couldn’t find any explanation 
for why it was taken out from the 1976 bill. 
PROF. GORDON: 
Jerry Reichman has some valuable discussion on that.223 
MR. MOSKIN: 
What scope of protection would you suggest be allowed to 
these design registrations? 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
Anti-copying, like copyright .  Short-term copyright. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Yes. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
And by the way, also the Paris Convention, gives freedom to 
the countries to decide whether designs should be protected 
 
 221 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 26.3, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1207 (1994).  
 222 Albert C. Johnston, Where Is the Protection for Creative Product Design?, 19 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 191, 194 (1989). 
223  See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 83, at 1262 n.644. 
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through the patent route, including a high threshold of novelty and 
strong monopoly right,224 or through a copyright system, which 
includes an originality threshold, and a right against copying.225  
Therofore, all the options are open.  The shorter copyright path is a 
better position in my view. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
I see some audience members with hands already in the air, so 
perhaps we can turn to the audience at this point. 
The organizers have asked that you please take the microphone 
and state your name before you begin speaking.  This is for the 
record, so who is eager to begin? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
With respect to simply depositing registration of designs, with 
a copyright, you have an intentional infringement issue.  
Infringement cannot occur unless somebody has actually copied 
something.226  That sets a threshold on an enforcement procedure. 
If you have an innocent infringement of a design, that creates 
the hazard of very significant amounts of litigation? 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
Well, I’m not familiar with all of the American cases, but as far 
as I know, for example, in European cases, ultimately the court 
 
 224 See Paris Convention on the Protection of Intellectual Property art. 5(5), Mar. 20, 
1883 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583; see also Orit Fischman Afori, 
Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 1105, 1129 (2008) 
[hereinafter Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing] (“At the Convention, there was a long 
debate as to whether designs should be included in this instrument.  This debate was 
partly resolved in 1958, when Article 5(5) of the Paris Convention was adopted, 
according to which ‘Industrial Designs shall be protected in all the countries of the 
Union.’  Notably the parties agreed only on the obligation to protect designs, without 
setting any standard with respect to the eligibility or scope of design protection.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 225 See Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing, supra note 224, at 1129 (“Notably, the 
parties agreed only on the obligation to protect designs, without setting any standard with 
respect to the eligibility or scope of design protection. Therefore, once something is 
identified as an industrial design according to a member state’s law, it is protected. 
However, such protection can be achieved by a wide spectrum of legal means, from 
copyright, to special design laws assimilated into patent law, to unfair competition 
law.”(footnotes omitted)). 
 226 See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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asks whether it was copied.  There is a limitless range of scenarios.  
Ultimately, the question turns to focus on whether there was 
copying or not.  I’m proposing to admit that in reality design law is 
treated as a short term copyright and courts do look after an act of 
copying in order to conclude that there was infringement. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Yes, I don’t think the U.S. has a subjective standard of good 
faith on design infringement. 
PROF. JANIS: 
For U.S. design patents, after Egyptian Goddess, I think we’re 
moving away from the anti-copying regime because when there 
was a requirement to show appropriation of points of novelty and 
substantial similarity,227 that was very much like copyright and it 
was pretty hard to imagine the case where unintentionally, you 
appropriated all these points of novelty.  That point-of-novelty test 
is now gone, so one could say that it raises the possibility of 
unintentional infringement.  I kind of doubt that it will happen, but 
at least there is the possibility of that. 
So that’s the trend in U.S. design patent enforcement, going 
away from a copyright model, as I would characterize it, anyway. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Well, the fact is, is that anyone who’s litigated any of these 
sorts of cases knows patent cases as well as copyright.  Copyright 
is inherent in the definition of infringement, yes, there must be an 
initial finding of copying.  But, of course, that can be established 
through indirect proof of access and similarity,228 but every one of 
these sorts of cases, frequently, gets bogged down in accusations of 
willful infringement and copying. 
 
 227 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 228 Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140 (“Copying may be established either by direct 
evidence of copying or by indirect evidence, including access to the copyrighted work, 
similarities that are probative of copying between the works, and expert testimony.  If 
actual copying is established, a plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an 
improper appropriation by demonstrating that substantial similarity to protected material 
exists between the two works.”).   
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Design patent cases, or any kind of patent case, you want to get 
willful infringement because it enhances your damages.229  
Trademark cases, even though there are plenty of cases saying that 
we don’t care whether copying was intentional because that 
doesn’t influence whether consumers are going to be confused, but 
the fact is that this is the law, it all comes down to the law of unfair 
competition and these cases all turn off and on, on proof of bad 
faith and copying.  It’s what makes litigation, frankly, so 
expensive.  Because we’re all so busy trying to point fingers at one 
another and show what evil characters our adversaries are. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Yes, but willful infringement can arise after a notice letter. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
Right. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
It doesn’t have to predate the infringement? 
MR. MOSKIN: 
No, I’m not saying every case, it will—no, there certainly are 
exceptions. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Are there additional questions? 
Up in the back.  Thank you. 
MS. WONG: 
Good morning.  Tzen Wong.  It’s a question to Professor Afori, 
somewhat inspired by Professor Scafidi’s reference to your work 
on cultural rights as human rights.  Just wondering, in your 
opinion, do designers or design rights, have a place in the 
discussion on cultural rights? 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
Again, is the question whether designers have a cultural right? 
MS. WONG: 
 
 229 See Justin P. Huddleson, Note, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Imperical Evaluation 
of In Re Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 102 (2009).  
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Yes.  Would they have a place in the discussion about cultural 
rights? 
PROF. GORDON: 
Are you talking about things like indigenous designs in 
Australia? 
MS. WONG: 
That would be one way of approaching it, but I was thinking 
about it more broadly. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
Well, I think that even if they have a cultural right, it’s not 
undermining, in any context, my proposal to have short-term 
protection. 
I mean, the cultural issue or the constitutional issue of human 
rights is, I think, at another level.  Maybe it has implication in the 
scope of protection or in the exceptions and limitations. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
You’re thinking, perhaps, of their moral rights as well?  Or no? 
MS. WONG: 
I’d love to hear the answer to that question. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
No, I think that designers should enjoy moral rights.  I know 
I’m going to be stoned here in the U.S., but I’m pro-moral rights.  
In France, for example, designers are regarded as creators or 
authors and there should be no discrimination between a designer 
and a painter: all are “arts” and all should enjoy moral rights.230  
But there is a question as to how to define the scope of protection 
according to the subject matter; and a painting should be 
distinguished from a hairbrush.  There is no logic in protecting the 
 
 230 See Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why the Congress Should Adopt a 
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 319 
(2007) (explaining that French copyright law has been extended to original fashion 
designs and copyright holders receive moral rights the moment they create original 
work).  
C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2010  2:43 PM 
842 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:783 
design of a hairbrush for life of the designer plus seventy years.231  
It’s too much, hairbrushes should have no more than ten years.  
Anyway, after two years, it’s a non-issue. 
PROF. GORDON: 
I’ve never been able to keep a hairbrush for ten years. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
In any case, are there any other questions? 
Yes, down at the front? 
MS. ASCHER: 
I’d like to ask Professor Janis, you indicated a lot of areas 
where you’re not really happy with design protection coming 
through patent law. 
Do you have a recommendation that would work, aside from 
case-by-case litigation, actually, for cleaning it up?  Would you 
recommend a statute; an additional amendment?  Or what would 
your recommendation be to put some of these lawyers out of 
work? 
PROF. JANIS: 
Oh, I would hope not to do that, at least if they’re lawyers 
coming from my class in Indiana. 
The simple way to answer it would be to say, oh, we should 
have comprehensive design protection legislation and it should be 
patterned after the legislation that we have in Europe. 
We’ve tried and tried and tried and we’ve never been able to 
accomplish that, so that leads me to ask a more pragmatic question, 
so if we’re sticking with the regimes that we have, what kinds of 
smaller reforms could be made, smaller reforms to the design 
patent regime, assuming no movement in the trade dress regime. 
I would say perhaps we need to make a statutory change, to 
impose some other requirement other than obviousness.  At the 
very least, we need to change the rhetoric.  It may be that the 
analysis doesn’t turn out to be that much different, but to change 
 
 231 Copyright protection in the European Union exists for the life of the author plus 
seventy years. Council Directive 93/98, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 11 (EC). 
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the rhetoric away from utility patent rhetoric, so we’re not talking 
about obviousness anymore, we’re talking about individual 
character, something else. 
Similarly, a change in the law, by which we would not talk 
about claims, to a patent lawyer, that just invites an element-by-
element sort of analysis, a feature-by-feature kind of analysis, and I 
think that’s been problematic in the area of design patents. 
And certainly there’s a lot more work to be done, specifically 
in the doctrine of functionality.  There are all kinds of inconsistent 
pronouncements—you have cases that say the standard is dictated 
by functionality and at the same time say the standard is primarily 
functional. The Federal Circuit has recited them back-to-back in 
the same case.232  So the court has a role, too, in effectuating some 
important reforms, even if we think of them as small-scale reforms. 
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI: 
I just want to pop up with another answer to the question from 
this direction.  It’s a very good question and I think another 
supplementary answer to the situation of non-copying similarities 
is the court’s impulse to grant restitution or use similar doctrines 
such as unfair competition, misappropriation, or unjust enrichment.  
Such doctrines can be used as a supplementary answer to a 
situation where there are similarities which are not made by 
intentional copying.  So it’s again, common law proposals, but I 
think it works. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
Is there one other question? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
If you move away from a patent style analysis of design 
patents, how does the legal analysis of the design ever get 
appealed? 
PROF. JANIS: 
How does it ever get appealed? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
 
 232 PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Yes, without a judge going through word-by-word, element-
by-element, describing what he’s thinking and what the design is 
and what the prior art is and what the infringement is, how do you 
ever get an appeal of a decision? 
PROF. JANIS: 
I don’t think there is a good answer to it, but you see it coming 
up in trade dress law too.  If we’re protecting the overall 
appearance, there are a lot of different ways to define that.  There 
are ways to define it post-hoc, for litigation purposes, that would 
seem troubling and objectionable. That could even happen under 
the current regime of design patents, even though we act like the 
scope of rights is a little more formally defined in advance, and we 
have a claim.  It certainly could happen in the less formal regime 
that I’m talking about. 
I think that that is a problem, but I think it’s endemic to the 
area. That’s always going to be difficult in design, probably no 
matter which type of regime that one uses. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
I mean, what your question called to mind is the standard of 
review that’s often invoked in copyright cases, that if it’s simply a 
pictorial or graphic thing, with courts, the appellate courts will say, 
we are in as good of a position as the district courts to review that 
picture or thing or culture, whatever it may be, for purposes of 
appellate review.233 
Nonetheless, although there is a certain amount of difference 
that I think the cases now increasingly say, when the appellate 
courts do that kind of analysis.  But I think it always behooves the 
litigant to do the best possible job of articulating what are those 
elements, even if it’s not required. 
I mean, in some cases, now in trade dress cases, it is becoming 
required and in design patent cases—if you can’t tell the jury what 
is so unique, or in the old days, what are the points of novelty, 
you’re probably not going to win. 
 
 233 See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Winger, 591 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  The court of 
appeals reversed the district court’s decision that an outdoor lighting fixture was eligible 
for copyright protection as a “work of art.” See id.  
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So again, I think it behooves litigants to do it anyway, even if 
it’s not a requirement. 
PROF. JANIS: 
You also have to think about who’s the ordinary observer too, 
for purposes of design patents.  And that’s more complicated now, 
after the Egyptian Goddess case.  But that’s another place where a 
litigant could do exactly what was being suggested.  You could go 
well beyond the minimal requirements of the law in articulating 
who is the ordinary observer for purposes of your case. 
I do think that the way that’s now defined, an ordinary observer 
is a little less ordinary than it used to be and less like the appellate 
judge than it used to be and that really creates the complication that 
you’re talking about. 
MR. MOSKIN: 
And it’s also complicated by the fact that you’re not supposed 
to use the commercial embodiment as the basis for assessing 
infringement, but rather what’s claimed in the pictures.234  If the 
person who drafted the design patent was attentive to some of the 
things that you can do using phantom lines, so forth, it can be very 
difficult to figure out, well, what am I supposed to show an 
ordinary observer for him or her to define as the real element for 
the purpose of making a comparison of some sort. 
PROF. SCAFIDI: 
All right.  At this point, I have received the signal that only two 
words can stand between you all and lunch and those words are 
“thank you.” 
 
 234 See, e.g., Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1196 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
